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I. INTRODUCTION
In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,' the U.S. Supreme
Court vacated a state supreme court decision in which a justice who
had received $3 million in campaign support from a litigant cast the
deciding vote to relieve the litigant of a $50 million liability. 2 The
Court reached this result, one I view as compelled by common sense,
through a 5-4 vote, 3 with the dissenters, led by Chief Justice John
Roberts and Justice Antonin Scalia, minimizing the danger of biased
judging presented by the situation 4 and questioning the practical
1. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
2. See infra text accompanying notes -. Technically, the campaign
contributor was not a formal party to the litigation. He was, however, the CEO of
litigant Massey as well as the personification of the company.
3. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (Kennedy, J., joined by Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., forming the majority voting to vacate West Virginia
Supreme Court decision where state court justice casting deciding vote had
received $3 million in campaign aid from CEO of defendant Massey; and Roberts,
C.J., joined by Scalia, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., voting to let the decision stand in spite
of key participation by challenged state court justice); id. at 2274-75 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (shorter dissent criticizing majority for extending due process review to
cases ofjudicial recusal based on campaign activity).
4. See id at 2273 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("And why is the Court so
convinced that this is an extreme case? It is true that Don Blankenship spent a
large amount of money in connection with this election. But this point cannot be
emphasized strongly enough: Other than a $1,000 direct contribution from
Blankenship, [disqualified West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals] Justice
[Brent] Benjamin and his campaign had no control over how this money was
250 [Vol. 29:2
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feasibility of the Court's approach as well as the wisdom of
expanding review of state court judicial disqualification pursuant to
the Due Process Clause.
5
Although its critics see Caperton as an unwise intrusion into
state elections and state disqualification practice, 6 Caperton's biggest
problem is that it did not go far enough and make due process
congruent with prevailing state and federal disqualification
standards. By crafting an "serious risk of actual bias" test for due
process-based constitutional disqualification that differs (albeit
perhaps not greatly) from the well-established general approach to
disqualification of a judge when his or her impartiality may be
reasonably questioned, the Court has been unduly tentative and
confusing in setting the parameters of judicial impartiality. The
Court should recognize that any error in failing to recuse 7 deprives
spent."); see also id. at 2273 ("Moreover, Blankenship's [$3 million in]
independent expenditures do not appear 'grossly disproportionate' compared to
other such expenditures in this very election."); id. at 2275 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("The Court today continues its quixotic quest to right all wrongs and repair all
imperfections through the Constitution. Alas, the quest cannot succeed-which is
why some wrongs and imperfections have been called nonjusticiable.").
5. See id. at 2267 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (contending that the "end result
[of the majority's decision favoring disqualification] will do far more to erode
public confidence in judicial impartiality than an isolated failure to recuse in a
particular case" and raising a list of specific questions regarding application of
majority's standards for judicial impartiality satisfying constitutional due process);
id. at 2274 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In the best of all possible worlds, should
judges sometimes recuse even where the clear commands of our prior due process
law do not require it? Undoubtedly. The relevant question, however, is whether
we do more good than harm by seeking to correct this imperfection through
expansion of our constitutional mandate in a manner ungovemed by any
discernable rule. The answer is obvious.").
More precisely, the Roberts dissent posed 40 questions in defense of its view
that the majority's invocation of the Due Process Clause to require judicial
disqualification due to receipt of enormous campaign contributions was not a
sustainably practical approach to policing the judicial integrity of state courts. Id.
at 2267, 2269-72 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Forty enumerated questions, that is,
with many containing subparts or follow-up questions. If one calculates the total
number of questions in the Roberts dissent as one would in reviewing litigation
interrogatories, the total number of questions actually totals 80 queries.
6. See infra Part IJI.C.
7. This article treats the words "disqualification" and "recusal" as
synonyms. Some courts and commentators have historically distinguished the
terms, suggesting that disqualification is a judge's mandatory obligation to avoid
participation in a case while recusal is a more voluntary, discretionary act
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the affected litigant of a fundamental constitutional right-the right
to have the case heard by a neutral adjudicator. Consequently, any
erroneous rejection of a request to recuse is at least technically one
of constitutional dimension that should be potentially subject to U.S.
Supreme Court review and correction.
8
However, the Court need not become mired in the flood of
disqualification cases predicted by the dissenting justices in
Caperton. Insistence upon review of disqualification decisions by a
neutral body of judges can be used to ensure that litigants receive
sufficient procedural due process. The constitutional question
surrounding judicial recusal is primarily one of procedural due
process. If states put in place adequate procedures for deciding and
reviewing disqualification motions, few Caperton-like situations
compelling high court intervention are likely to ensue. 9  Where
erroneous recusal decisions occur in spite of such safeguards, U.S.
Supreme Court review should be at least potentially available as
necessary to vindicate the strong constitutional interest in neutral
courts and fair adjudication, an interest sounding in substantive due
process. 10 The Court need exercise this potential power only in
relatively egregious cases, thereby promoting judicial economy
while nonetheless discouraging disqualification abuses.
In making its assessments regarding whether review of non-
disqualification is required, the Court should generally consider the
five factors set forth in this article"1 and, in cases involving campaign
support as a basis for recusal, the considerations outlined in the
amicus brief of the Conference of Chief Justices. 12  Using these
informed by the judge's own preferences as well as prevailing law. See RICHARD
E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF
JUDGES § 20.8, at 604-12 (2d ed. 2007) (noting traditional distinction but using
terms interchangeably throughout the treatise); JAMES J. ALFINI, STEVEN LUBET,
JEFFREY M. SHAMAN & CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND
ETHICS, § 4.04 at 4-11 (2007) (tending to use disqualification as preferred term but
using recusal as acceptable synonym); Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 431, 460 (2004) (outlining traditional distinction between the terms); Debra
Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts, 87 IOWA L.
REV. 1213 (2002) (using terms interchangeably).
8. See infra Part III.D.
9. See infra Part V.B.
10. See infra Part IV.A.
11. See infra Part IV.E.2.
12. See infra note 48 and accompanying text. This amicus brief, which will
generally be referred to as the Chief Justices' brief, should be distinguished from
[Vol. 29:2
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yardsticks, the Court can, as necessary, make infrequent forays into
judicial disqualification matters without unduly burdening the Court
or creating either uncertainty or paranoia among state judges and
justices.
Part I of this article reviews the Caperton case and the
Court's decision. Part II assesses Caperton and criticisms of the
decision, including comparison of Caperton's constitutional standard
(existence of an objective probability of bias by the judge or justice
under review) with the nonconstitutional standard for judicial
neutrality under federal law and state law patterned after the ABA
Code of Judicial Conduct (existence of a reasonable question as to
the challenged jurist's impartiality). Finding that the latter standard
better protects litigants and can be employed without undue strain on
the judicial system, Part III advocates that Caperton's constitutional
due process disqualification standard be harmonized with the
prevailing nonconstitutional standards. It also examines the issues of
procedural and substantive due process and outlines the factors for
use in recusal cases growing out of campaign support and those
applicable to Supreme Court policing of state court disqualification
decisions generally.
Rather than maintaining a separate standard for policing
judicial disqualification pursuant to the Due Process Clause, the
Court should recognize that any erroneous failure to recuse deprives
a litigant of due process and makes a resulting judgment subject to
review. However, the Court, using its broad discretion in controlling
its docket, need not give serious consideration to every claim of
inadequate judicial disqualification but should grant review only in
cases such as Caperton where permitting a tainted jurist to sit
constitutes a clear and serious violation of the norms of judicial
ethics.
two other additional amicus briefs, one submitted by 27 former chief justices in
support of Caperton and another one supporting Massey filed by ten former state
justices. See infra note , which lists the amicus briefs. I shall resist the temptation
to refer to the first two briefs as the "good" justices' briefs and the latter as the
"bad" justices' brief, but that would not be an unfair characterization. See infra
Part III.D (finding Caperton clearly correctly decided on the merits).
Winter 2010] 253
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II. THE ROAD TO CAPERTON
A. The Underlying Action
The Caperton v. Massey drama began when Hugh Caperton
purchased the Harman Mine in southwestern Virginia in 1993. The
mine contained "high-grade metallurgical coal, a hot-burning and
especially pure variety that steel mills crave to fuel the blast furnaces
used to make coke needed in their production process.'' 13  A.T.
Massey Coal Company, led by CEO Don L. Blankenship, wanted to
acquire the Harman Mine and its high-grade coal, but Caperton was
unwilling to sell. 14  Through a series of commercial and legal
initiatives, which Caperton viewed as fraudulent and predatory but
Massey characterized as merely aggressive business, Massey
eventually drove the Harman Mining Corporation and other
Caperton corporate entities into bankruptcy. 15 "Through a series of
complex, almost Byzantine transactions, including the acquisition of
Harman's prime customer and the land surrounding the competing
mine, Massey both landlocked Harman with no road or rail access
and left Caperton without a market for his coal even if he could ship
it."' 6 In 1998, Caperton agreed to sell the Harman Mine to Massey
but the deal collapsed down the home stretch as Massey insisted on
changes that Caperton contended reflected bad faith and an attempt
to ruin the Caperton interests. 
1 7
Caperton's companies (Harman Mining Corporation, Harman
Development Corporation, and Sovereign Coal Sales, Inc.),' 8 filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 1998 facing $25 million in claims. 19
Caperton, who had personally guaranteed $1.9 million of his
companies' debt, 20 sued Massey in West Virginia,2' alleging fraud
13. John Gibeaut, Caperton's Coal, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2009, at 52.
14. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 232 (W. Va. 2008).
15. Id. at 229-33 (providing extensive background of case in opinion written
by three state court justices who ruled for Massey), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
16. Gibeaut, supra note , at 52; see also Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 230-33
(providing factual background).
17. Gibeaut, supra note , at 52.
18. The relation of the Caperton companies and Mr. Caperton is discussed at
Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 230.
19. Brief of Appellee Hugh M. Caperton at 13, Caperton 679 S.E.2d 223
(No. 33350), 2007 WL 2886509.
20. Id. The Caperton guarantees included interest on the unpaid amounts. Id.
[Vol. 29:2254
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and tortious interference with contract, obtaining a $50 million jury
verdict in 2002 that survived vigorous post-trial attack by Massey.22
The trial court rejected Massey's new trial and remittitur motions in
June 2004 and in March 2005 denied Massey's motion for judgment
as a matter of law.
23
B. The 2004 West Virginia Supreme Court Elections
Elections for the West Virginia Supreme Court24 were slated
for November 2004, with Justice Warren McGraw seeking re-
21. Other plaintiffs in the West Virginia action were Harman Development
Corporation, Harman Mining Corporation, and Sovereign Coal Sales, Inc. Id. at 2.
In addition to Massey, other defendants in the case were Massey subsidiaries Elk
Run Coal Co., Inc., Independence Coal Co., Inc., Marfork Coal Co., Inc.,
Performance Coal Co., Inc., and Massey Coal Sales Co., Inc. Id. at 3. Unless
otherwise noted, these plaintiffs will generally be referred to as "Caperton," as the
U.S. Supreme Court did in its opinion. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.
Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009).
Harman Mining and Sovereign Coal also sued Wellmore, a Massey
subsidiary, in Virginia for breach of contract and bad faith in connection with
Wellmore's failure to purchase Harman coal as promised, which was based on
Massey's assertion of a force majeure excuse from contract performance due to the
closing of an LTV steel plant that was Wellmore's primary customer. Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Coal Co, 679 S.E.2d 223, 233 (W. Va. 2008). According to Massey
counsel, Harman Mining "voluntarily withdrew" the tort claim originally pleaded
"prior to trial in the Virginia action with assurances that [Harman] would not later
assert such a claim." Appellant Brief of A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc. at 9,
Caperton, 679 S.E.2d 223 (No. 33350), 2007 WL 2886508. The jury in the
Virginia breach of contract action rendered a jury verdict of $6 million for
Harman. "The appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court was refused on technical
grounds." Id. The parties' dispute over the preclusive effect, if any, of the
Virginia action over the West Virginia action was perhaps the key issue before the
West Virginia Supreme Court and was the basis for Massey's success in the case
when it involved Justice Benjamin. See infra note and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 98-C-192, 2005 WL
5679073 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 15, 2005) (entitled "Final Order: Denying
Defendants' Rule 50(b) Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law; Rule 50(c)/59
Motion for New Trial, or in the Alternative, Motion for Remittitur"-a 17-page
opinion denying Massey motions and awarding post-judgment interest at ten
percent annual rate from date of August 15, 2002 judgment for Caperton).
23. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257 ("In March 2005, the trial court denied
Massey's motion for judgment as a matter of law.").
24. The proper name of the state's highest court is the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia. For ease of reference, this article will generally refer to
it as the West Virginia Supreme Court.
Winter 20101 255
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election. Massey CEO Blankenship threw his support to challenger
Brent Benjamin. 25 Blankenship contributed the statutory maximum
of $1,000 to the Benjamin campaign committee and also donated
nearly $2.5 million to a political organization named "And For The
Sake Of The Kids," which oposed Justice McGraw and advocated
Justice Benjamin's election. 2V In addition, Blankenship spent more
than $500,000 independently on television and newspaper
advertisements favoring Justice Benjamin as well as for fundraising
on behalf of Justice Benjamin. 27  As the U.S. Supreme Court
summarized, "Blankenship's $3 million in contributions were more
than the total amount spent by all other Benjamin supporters and
three times the amount spent by Benjamin's own committee.
Caperton contends that Blankenship spent $1 million more than the
total amount spent by the campaign committees of both candidates
combined. 28
Justice Benjamin won with slightly more than 53% of the
more than 700,000 votes cast.29 Although Justice McGraw appears
to have had some significant electoral baggage that may have more
than offset the advantage incumbents traditionally possess, 30 the
25. Elliot G. Hicks, Editorial, Merit selection, not elections, must be how we
choose justices, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Dec. 14, 2004, at 5A; Millions spent to
defeat Warren McGraw, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Dec. 4, 2004, at 3A; Cecil E.
Roberts, Editorial, Blankenship's hollow rhetoric; His money defeated McGraw,
now he must help miners, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Dec. 13, 2004, at 5A.
26. See Paul N. Nyden, U.S. SUPREME COURT; They are not friends
dinner; Campaign report shows connections between Blankenship, Benjamin,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Feb. 15, 2009, at IA (noting that And For the Sake of The
Kids "specialized in running negative ad[vertisements]" targeting Justice
McGraw); Marcia Coyle, Amici Urge Recusals in Cases of Substantial Election
Contributions, TEX. LAW., Jan. 12, 2009, at 5, 5 (noting that And For The Sake of
The Kids worked to defeat Justice McGraw).
27. See, e.g., DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 2004 4-5 (Jesse Rutledge ed., 2004), available at http://www.
gavelgrab.org/wp-content/resources/NewPoliticsReport2004.pdf (advertisement
opposing McGraw accused him of letting a child rapist out of prison and allowing
him to work as a high school janitor).
28. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257 (internal citation omitted).
29. See id ("Benjamin won. He received 382,036 votes (53.3%) and
McGraw received 334,301 votes (46.7%).").
30. The dissenters in particular stressed McGraw's perceived deficiencies as
a candidate as part of their argument that the election outcome, and Benjamin's
purported gratitude toward Blankenship, could not conclusively be said to flow
from Blankenship's massive financial support of Benjamin's candidates:
256 [Vol. 29:2
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consensus of observers appears to be that Blankenship's heavy
financial support was a key factor in Justice Benjamin's election.31
C. Review and Recusal
After the election and adjudication of post-trial motions in
Caperton v. Massey, Massey sought review of the $50 million
judgment. Caperton sought Justice Benjamin's recusal, which he
denied in April 2006.32 According to Justice Benjamin, there was
"no objective information ... to show that this Justice has a bias for
or against any litigant, that this Justice has prejudged the matters
It is also far from clear that Blankenship's expenditures affected the
outcome of this election. Justice Benjamin won by a comfortable 7-point
margin (53.3% to 46.7%). Many observers believed that Justice
Benjamin's opponent doomed his candidacy by giving a well-publicized
speech that made several curious allegations; this speech was described in
the local media as "deeply disturbing" and worse. Justice Benjamin's
opponent also refused to give interviews or participate in debates. All but
one of the major West Virginia newspapers endorsed Justice Benjamin.
Justice Benjamin just might have won because the voters of West
Virginia thought he would be a better judge than his opponent. Unlike
the majority, I cannot say with any degree of certainty that Blankenship
"cho[se] the judge in his own cause." I would give the voters of West
Virginia more credit than that.
Id. at 2274 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting)
(alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
Although Justice Roberts's confidence in the electorate is touching, it is at
considerable odds with a substantial amount of political science literature finding
that voters are extremely ill-informed in low-visibility races such as judicial
elections and that advertising and campaign spending play a particularly pivotal
role in such races. See Lawrence Baum, Judicial Elections and Judicial
Independence: The Voter's Perspective, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 18-26 (2003)
(arguing that voters in judicial elections get little information and tend to make
uninformed decisions); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note , at 40 (commenting that low
voting rates allow special interest groups to swing campaigns and suggesting
judicial voter guides as a solution); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Malignant Democracy:
Core Fallacies Underlying Election of the Judiciary, 4 NEV. L.J. 35, 45-46 (2003)
(noting that the media affects judicial elections).
In addition, a review of contemporary news accounts of the hard-fought 2004
West Virginia Supreme Court election suggests that Blankenship's financial
support translated into an effective media campaign on behalf of the Benjamin
candidacy. See sources cited supra note.
31. See sources cited supra note.
32. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
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which comprise this litigation, or that this Justice will be anything
but fair and impartial. 33
In November 2007, the West Virginia high court reversed the
$50 million judgment against Massey in a 3-2 decision in which
Justice Benjamin joined two others for the decisive vote.34 The
dissenting justices characterized the majority's pro-Massey opinion,
based on a forum selection clause and res judicata, as "new law" at
odds with prior Court precedent-a convenient instance of law
reform to assist Justice Benjamin's major benefactor. 35
Caperton sought rehearing and more recusal motions
followed, with Caperton and Massey moving for disqualification of
three of the five justices involved in the November 2007 decision:
Photos had surfaced of [majority opinion, pro-
Massey] Justice Maynard vacationing with
Blankenship in the French Riviera while the case was
pending. Justice Maynard granted Caperton's recusal
motion. On the other side Justice Starcher granted
Massey's recusal motion, apparently based on his
public criticism of Blankenship's role in the 2004
elections. In his recusal memorandum Justice
Starcher urged Justice Benjamin to recuse himself as
well.36
33. Id. at 2258 (alteration in original); see also Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal
Co., 679 S.E.2d 223 (W. Va. 2008) (full Benjamin opinion refusing
disqualification), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
34. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 33350, 2007 WL 4150960 (W.
Va. Nov. 21, 2007), superseded on reh 'g, 679 S.E.2d 223 (W. Va. 2008).
35. The West Virginia Court reasoned:
[F]irst, that a forum-selection clause contained in a contract to which
Massey was not a party barred the suit in West Virginia, and second, that
res judicata barred the suit due to an out-of-state judgment to which
Massey was not a party. Justice Starcher dissented, stating that the
"majority's opinion is morally and legally wrong." Justice Albright also
dissented, accusing the majority of "misapplying the law and introducing
sweeping 'new law' into our jurisprudence that may well come back to
haunt us."
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258 (internal citations omitted).
36. Id.
[Vol. 29:2
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Justice Starcher also characterized Blankenship's sociopolitical
electioneering activities as a "cancer" on the West Virginia high
court.
3 7
Justice Benjamin again refused to recuse and also rejected a
38third Caperton motion for disqualification. In his capacity as
acting chief justice, he was not only free to participate in the
rehearing, but also replaced the two recused justices. In April
2008, the West Virginia Supreme Court again ruled 3-2 in Massey's
favor, with Justice Benjamin again in the slim majority.40 The two
justices appointed to the case by Justice Benjamin split their votes. 4 1
Again, the two-justice dissent was strong, raising serious questions
about the majority's rulings on the substantive law 42 and complaints
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 285 (W. Va. 2008).
41. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258.
42. See id. (noting concerns of dissenting justices); Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at
284 (Albright & Cookman, JJ., dissenting) ("Not only is the majority opinion
unsupported by the facts and existing case law, but it is also fundamentally unfair.
Sadly, justice was neither honored nor served by the majority.").
What distressed Justices Albright and Cookman was the Benjamin majority's
ruling that Caperton's West Virginia claims were barred because of the prior
Harman Mining litigation in Virginia against Wellmore. See discussion supra note
Although the West Virginia and Virginia cases are connected by virtue of the
Blankenship-Massey machinations aimed at taking control of the Harman Mine,
the cases largely involved different legal claims and arguments, different facts and
evidence, and different parties. Consequently, only the broadest view of the
"logical relationship" test for assessing res judicata would bar the West Virginia
action due to Harman's success in the Virginia lawsuit. Further, as Caperton was
argued, the controlling Virginia precedent on res judicata (applicable to the West
Virginia case via choice of law principles), purported to follow the same-law-
facts-evidence test rather than the logical relationship test. See Caperton, 679
S.E.2d at 281-82 (Albright & Cookman, JJ., dissenting) (citing Virginia caselaw
on res judicata, including Davis v. Marshall Homes, Inc., 576 S.E.2d 504 (Va.
2003)), rev'd 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009); see generally FLEMING JAMES, GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIviL PROCEDURE 671-739 (5th ed. 2001)
(comprehensive review of res judicata); RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL
PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 1094-97 (5th ed. 2009) (outlining established
approaches to determining res judicata). The other successful ground in Massey's
challenge to the $50 million verdict was the assertion that a forum selection clause
in a Wellmore-Harman Mining contract controlled and that Massey, which was
not a party to that contract, had standing to enforce the clause. See Caperton, 679
S.E.2d at 234-35. The clause in question provides that the Wellmore-Harman
Mining
Winter 20 10] 259
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about Justice Benjamin's refusal to recuse pursuant to the West
Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct and the Due Process Clause.43
[a]greement, in all respects, shall be governed, construed and enforced in
accordance with the substantive laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia.
All actions brought in connection with this Agreement shall be filed in
and decided by the Circuit Court of Buchanan County, Virginia ....
Id. at 234 (alterations in original).
A full discussion of the merits of Massey's res judicata and forum selection
arguments lies beyond the scope of this article. However, even a brief look at
these issues suggests that the West Virginia decision favoring Massey is
problematic and open to criticism. For example, the West Virginia Supreme Court
majority's discussion of the forum selection clause issue, despite its length, is
shockingly bad in that it fails to grapple with the key question: Is the Caperton
fraud and tortious interference action brought in West Virginia sufficiently closely
connected to the Wellmore-Harman Mine breach of contract action that it also was
required to be brought in Buchanan County, Virginia?
The West Virginia Caperton majority simply glosses over this question in a
manner that would dismay a law professor reading student exams in that it
resembles twenty pages of a mediocre student answer that fails to address the
determinative and most difficult question posed. Rather than reflect seriously on
the issue, the West Virginia majority instead opts for the "C" student's trick of
showering the reader with statements of doctrine unmoored from the context of the
case. My own view is that the term "in connection with," although perhaps not
narrow, is far less sweeping than phrases such as "relating to" or "arising out of'
typically found in forum selection clauses. Consequently, it is to me not at all
obvious that the Caperton fraud action needed to be brought in Buchanan County,
Virginia.
More substantively, the issue is whether the Virginia contract action, which
involved Massey and Blankenship's allegedly unfounded assertion of a force
majeure exception to performing the Wellmore contract with Harman Mine, was
sufficiently intertwined with the larger Massey-Blankenship efforts to bring down
Caperton to require that the second suit be subject to the Buchanan County forum
requirement. Although there was of course a connection between Massey's
alleged improper breach of contract and other Massey actions against Caperton
(they were all part of a "get Caperton" effort), many or perhaps most courts would
view the West Virginia court's enforcement of the forum selection clause as an
example of the Wellmore contract "tail" wagging the Massey-conspiracy-against-
Caperton "dog" and would not find the clause to reach so far (even if one gets over
the substantial hurdle of letting Massey, a nonparty to the Wellmore-Harman
contract, enforce the clause).
On the merits, the West Virginia majority's decision is open to serious
question and will appear to be downright wrong to many civil procedure scholars
and practicing lawyers. Caperton was thus not a case in which it could be said that
the correct result was so clear that it precluded concern that lack of neutrality by a
judge may have played a critical role in the outcome.
43. See infra Part III.A.
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D. The Supreme Court Intervenes
Caperton successfully sought certiorari. 4  By this time, the
case had become widely discussed in the media.45 It was thoroughly
briefed,46  including amicus briefs from the American Bar
Association (which supported Caperton)47 and the Conference of
Chief Justices, which suggested a list of relevant factors for
consideration in assessing due process recusal claims (and that
effectively provided tacit support to Caperton)48 as well as 15 other
44. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 593 (2008).
45. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Review Sought on Judicial Recusals; W. Va. Case
Triggers Key Ethical Query, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 4, 2008, col. 3 (discussing Caperton
generally and the implications of possible holdings by the U.S. Supreme Court);
Lawrence Messina, Legal groups blast W. Va. Justice in Massey case,
CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Aug. 5, 2008, available at http://www.dailymail.com/
News/200808050215 (discussing the facts of the Caperton case generally); Paul J.
Nyden, ABA, groups urge high court to grant Harman appeal, Benjamin shouldn't
have heard Massey case, groups argue, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Aug. 5, 2008, at
IA (explaining the conflict of interest in Caperton and the ABA's request that the
U.S. Supreme Court decide the case in a manner mandating judicial recusal in
similar cases); Editorial, Too Generous, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2008, at WK8
(urging the U.S. Supreme Court to "add the Massey case to its docket").
46. See Brief for Petitioners, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct.
2252 (2009) (No. 08-22), 2008 WL 5433361 (authored by counsel at prominent
firms Berthold, Tiano & O'Dell (Charleston, W. Va.), Buchanan Ingersoll &
Rooney, PC (Pittsburgh), Reed Smith LLP (Pittsburgh), and Gibson Dunn &
Crutcher LLP (Washington, D.C.) and, most notably, former U.S. Solicitor
General Theodore B. Olson); Brief for Respondents, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252
(No. 08-22), 2009 WL 216165 (authored by counsel at prominent firms Offutt
Nord, PLLC (Huntington, W. Va.), Hunton & Williams LLP (including Lewis F.
Powell III), and Mayer Brown LLP (Washington, D.C.) (most notably, veteran
Supreme Court advocates Andrew L. Frey and Evan M. Tager as well as UCLA
law professor Eugene Volokh)).
47. Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2008 WL 3199726 [hereinafter
Brief for American Bar Association].
48. See Brief of the Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Neither Party at 4-5, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2009 WL
45973 [hereinafter Brief of the Conference of Chief Justices]. The Chief Justices
took the position that:
A judge may be constitutionally disqualified from presiding over a
particular matter for reasons other than actual bias or a financial interest
in the outcome. These two categories alone are simply not broad enough
Winter 2010]
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amici.49  Although the Chief Justices' brief stopped short of
endorsing reversal, it connotatively favored Caperton in that it listed
to assure the due-process guarantee, which protects the right to a fair
hearing if extreme facts create a "probability of actual bias . . . too high to
be constitutionally tolerable," encompasses concerns about "possible
temptation to the average ... judge," "probability of unfairness," and not
being "likely to maintain that calm detachment" necessary for a judge to
deliver a fair adjudication. In particular, political support for a judge may
be so extremely extraordinary that due-process concerns are implicated.
Id. (internal citations to Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975); Tumey v.
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); and
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971) omitted).
In particular, the Chief Justices suggested that the Court consider the
following "Criteria for evaluating whether due process requires recusal for
campaign spending in a particular case":
* Size of the Expenditure
* Nature of the Support
* Timing of the Support
* Effectiveness of the Support
• Nature of Supporter's Prior Political Activities
* Nature of Supporter's Pre-existing Relationship with the Judge
* Relationship Between the Supporter and the Litigant
Id. at 25-29 (capitalization removed). The ABA Amicus Brief supported a
similar use of similar factors. See Brief for American Bar Association, supra note
, at 19-20 (factors include contribution size, importance, timing, and relationship
of judge and supporter). In addition, the ABA Brief noted former Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor's strong concern over the issue. See id. at 7 n.12 (citing Sandra
Day O'Connor, Op-Ed., Justice for Sale, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2007, at A25).
Justice O'Connor was sufficiently interested in the outcome of the case that she
attended the Caperton oral argument. See Steve Hooks, Industry mostly mum on
Manchin's judicial reform effort, PLATT'S COAL OUTLOOK, June 22, 2009 at 6
(discussing Caperton and noting that the "retired O'Connor attended the oral
arguments on Caperton v. Massey before the US Supreme Court in March. She
has been vocal in discussion of issues regarding the judiciary and campaign
contributions."); Kashmir Hill & David Lat, Jon Stewart Goes 'Behind the Robes'
of Sandra Day, http://www.abovethelaw.com/2009/03/
jon-stewart sandradayoconnor.php ("The retired justice was present in the
courtroom to attend argument in Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Company (a case
involving judicial independence, an issue near and dear to her heart).").
Although the Chief Justices' brief did not expressly support either side, its
overall message is one favorable to Caperton and it clearly had substantial
influence on the majority opinion.
49. Of the twenty-one amicus briefs relating to the merits, fourteen expressly
supported Caperton while five expressly supported Massey, with the Chief
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Justices' and the Louisiana Supreme Court's amicus briefs not taking a position.
The fourteen briefs supporting Caperton were filed by 12 different amici:
Brief for 27 Former Chief Justices and Justices as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2009 WL
45979 (former Chief Justices and Justices C.C. Torbert (Ala.); David
Newbern (Ark.); Norman Fletcher (Ga.), Charles McDevitt (Idaho);
Byron Johnson (Idaho); Harry T. Lemmon (La.); Conrad L. Mallett, Jr.
(Mich.); A.M. Keith (Minn.); Kathleen Blatz (Minn.); Russell Anderson
(Minn.); Edward D. Robertson, Jr. (Mo.); Jean A. Turnage (Mont.); John
Sheehy (Mont.); Robert Rose (Nev.); James Exum (N.C.); I. Beverly
Lake, Jr. (N.C.); Herbert L. Meschke (N.D.); Beryl Levine (N.D.);
Herbert R. Brown (Ohio); Edwin J. Peterson (Or.); John P. Flaherty (Pa.);
Raul Gonzalez (Tex.); Robert Utter (Wash.); Vernon Pearson (Wash.);
Richard Guy (Wash.); Richard Neely (W. Va.); and Louis Butler (Wis.));
Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Citizen in Support of Petitioners,
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2009 WL 45975;
Brief of Amicus Curiae the Committee for Economic Development in
support of Petitioners, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2008 WL
3165832 (Intel Corp., Lockheed Martin Corp., Pepsico, Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., Defense Trial Counsel of Indiana, Illinois Ass'n of Defense Counsel,
Transparency Int'l-USA);
Brief of the Center for Political Accountability and the Carol and
Lawrence Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2009 WL
45977;
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Washington Appellate Lawyers Association
in Support of Petitioners, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2008
WL 3199727;
Brief of the American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, Amicus Curiae, in
Support of Petitioners, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2009 WL
815213;
Brief for Justice at Stake et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2009 WL 45976;
Brief of the American Bar Association as Anicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2009 WL 45978;
Brief of American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2008 WL 3199726;
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Brief of Amici Curiae the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of
Law, the Campaign Legal Center, and the Reform Institute in Support of
Petitioners, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2009 WL 45972;
Brief of Amici Curiae the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of
Law, the Campaign Legal Center, and the Reform Institute in Support of
Petitioners, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2008 WL 3165831;
Brief of American Association for Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2009 WL 45971;
Brief of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22),
2009 WL 27299;
Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Caperton, 129 S. Ct.
2252 (No. 08-22), 2009 WL 45974 (corporations and organizations
committed to maintaining public confidence in the judicial system in
order to promote economic growth and development).
The four briefs supporting Massey were
Brief of Amicus Curiae Center for Competitive Politics in Support of
Respondents, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2009 WL 298463;
Brief of Law Professors Ronald D. Rotunda and Michael R. Dimino as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No.
08-22), 2009 WL 298468;
Brief of Amicus Curiae James Madison Center for Free Speech in
Support of Respondents, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2009
WL 298468;
Brief of Ten Current and Former Chief Justices and Justices as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-
22), 2009 WL 298467 (Perry 0. Hooper, Sr., (Ala.), Harold F. See, Jr.
(Ala.), Raoul G. Cantero, III (Fla.), Maura D. Corrigan (Mich.), Clifford
W. Taylor (Mich.), Robert P. Young, Jr. (Mich.), Burley B. Mitchell, Jr.
(N.C.), Evelyn Lundberg Stratton (Ohio), Craig T. Enoch (Tex.), Richard
B. Sanders (Wash.)).
Brief of the States of Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Louisiana,
Michigan, and Utah as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2009 WL 298466.
The two briefs that did not support either side were
Brief of the Conference of Chief Justices, supra note ;
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as an important factor the magnitude of collective campaign support
for a challenged judge. 50 Caperton's case was argued by former U.S.
Solicitor General Theodore Olson 5 1 while Massey retained
prominent Supreme Court advocate Andrew Frey.
52
In June 2009, the Court by a 5-4 majority sided with
Caperton and vacated the decision, reversing the $50 million
judgment.53 The Court observed:
that there is serious risk of actual bias-based on
objective and reasonable perceptions-when a person
with a personal stake in a particular case had a
significant and disproportionate influence in placing
the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the
judge's election campaign when the case was pending
or imminent. The inquiry centers on the
contribution's relative size in comparison to the total
amount of money contributed to the campaign, the
total amount spent in the election, and the apparent
effect such contribution had on the outcome of the
election.
Applying this principle, we conclude that
Blankenship's campaign efforts had a significant and
disproportionate influence in placing Justice
Benjamin on the case. 54
E. Caperton's Test for Determining When Recusal Is
Required by the Due Process Clause
The Blankenship-Benjamin situation violated the Due
Process Clause, according to the majority, in that it raised for the
reasonable lay observer the significant probability that Justice
Benjamin could not be fair in assessing such an important case
Brief of Amicus Curiae the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252
(No. 08-22), 2009 WL 434720.
50. See Brief of the Conference of Chief Justices, supra note.
51. See supra note. Transcript of Oral Argument, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252.
52. See supra note. Transcript of Oral Argument, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252.
53. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267.
54. Id. at 2263-64.
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implicating his sponsor Blankenship's finances. 55  Reviewing the
Court's due process disqualification precedents, the Court found that
Blankenship's campaign support was of sufficient magnitude to be
uncomfortably close to the type of personal, judicial, financial self-
interest in past cases that had merited judicial recusal.56
The majority reviewed the key precedents and concluded
they supported recusal in Caperton. 57  It divided past Court
precedent on due process disqualification into two broad categories.
The first was where a judge had a "direct, personal, substantial
pecuniary interest" in a case, a situation reflected in the long-
standing Anglo-American axiom that no person should be "allowed
to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest would certainly
bias his judgment, and not improbably, corrupt his integrity." 58 This
basis for disqualification, embracing a recusal standard going back to
Blackstonian England, has been expressly recognized since Tumey v.
Ohio was decided in 1927. 59  Operationalizing the standard in
Tumey, the Court stated that where the judge "had a financial interest
in the outcome of a case, although the interest was less than what
would have been considered personal or direct at common law" he
must recuse. The second established category where due process
required recusal was "where a judge had no pecuniary interest in the
case but was challenged because of a conflict arising from his
55. Id. at 2262-64.
56. See id. at 2262-64 (noting that his "campaign efforts had ... significant
and disproportionate influence").
57. See id. passim (discussing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813
(1986); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564
(1973); Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400
U.S. 455 (1971); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333
U.S. 683 (1948); and Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)).
58. Id. at 2259 (citing Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523; THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 59
(James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)).
59. Id. (citing Tumey, 273 U.S. at 520 as the seminal case in this category).
In Tumey, the village mayor sat as a judge in trying alcohol violations, receiving
extra compensation from his judicial duties that was funded by fines assessed for
conviction. 273 U.S. at 520. The Tumey Court concluded that this presented the
mayor with an unconstitutional conflict of interest. Id. at 532.
60. See, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259-60 (discussing Tumey, 273 U.S. at 520
and Ward, 409 U.S. at 60 as examples).
266 [Vol. 29:2
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participation in an earlier proceeding." 61 This approach has been
recognized since In re Murchison in 1955.62
Although the Court had not previously found due process to
require recusal due to election campaign support, the Caperton result
is quite consistent with Tumey and its progeny. For example, in the
1986 Aetna v. Lavoie decision,63 the Court found that an Alabama
Supreme Court justice's participation in a case that could set
favorable precedent for his similar suit against an insurer was the
type of financial interest that merited disqualification under the Due
Process Clause. 64 The Caperton majority viewed campaign financial
61. Id. at 2261 (citing Murchison, 349 U.S. at 133).
62. See Aetna, 475 U.S. at 822 (citing Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136).
63. Commentators generally supported the Lavoie holding and rationale. See,
e.g., Ignazio J. Ruvolo, California's Amendment to Canon 3E of the Code of
Judicial Conduct Requiring Self-Recusal of Disqualified Appellate Justices-Will
it be Reversible Error Not to Self-Recuse?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 529, 551
(2003); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV.
589, 640 (1987); S. Matthew Cook, Note, Extending the Due Process Clause to
Prevent a Previously Recused Judge from Later Attempting to Affect the Case from
Which He was Recused, 1997 BYU L. REv. 423, 441-42 (1997). The decision,
however, caused comparatively little stir when rendered, which arguably suggests
that the Caperton dissenters (see infra Part II.B) are excessively concerned that
Caperton will create a huge upsurge in recusal motions and related appeals and
certiorari petitions.
64. Aetna, 475 U.S. at 822. Arguably, however, Justice Benjamin's non-
recusal did violate this norm. Judges who are not re-elected lose their jobs and
their income. Although the Court focused on Justice Benjamin's potential
gratitude toward Blankenship, the opposite side of the coin is relevant. Just as
Blankenship could be instrumental in advancing a Benjamin candidacy, he could
also just as easily turn and help defeat a Benjamin re-election campaign if
displeased with Benjamin's failure to perform as anticipated. Career objectives are
pecuniary objectives. Even though Justice Benjamin would not directly benefit
from the outcome of Caperton v. Massey on the merits, it is only a small step to an
impact on his career and compensation should he support an outcome adverse to
Blankenship or a similarly well-heeled contributor. Obviously, this reverse side of
the coin can be pushed too far. A judge should not be disqualified, for example,
simply because a litigant with whom there is no prior relationship is powerful and
might oppose the judge in an ensuing election. But where the judge has already
enjoyed vast sums of support from an interested party, both the gratitude and
retaliation concerns become sufficiently concrete to counsel recusal.
I acknowledge the inconvenient fact that many judges leaving the bench, even
involuntarily, will often, or even perhaps usually, be able to make more money in
private practice. But even these judges ordinarily want very badly to retain their
judicial posts. They left practice for the bench for a reason and their set of
preferences is unlikely to have changed. In addition, there are some judges who, if
Winter 2010]
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support as something other than the type of direct pecuniary interest
that made a jurist a "judge in his own case." 65 Nonetheless, the
majority found the Benjamin non-recusal fell easily within the zone
of cases requiring recusal on due process grounds:
The proper constitutional inquiry is "whether sitting
on the case then before the [court] would offer a
possible temptation to the average judge to ... lead
him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true."
66
By this standard, Justice Benjamin's recusal was clearly
required. The average judge presiding over a very important ($50
million) case to a very substantial benefactor ($3 million) would of
course be tempted to be biased in favor of the benefactor and
prejudiced against his litigation opponent.
III. ASSESSING CAPERTON
A. The "Reasonable Question as to Impartiality"
Standard for Nonconstitutional Recusal under
Federal and State Law as Contrasted with the
Constitutional Due Process Standard of an "Serious
Risk ofActual Bias"
Justice Benjamin was also clearly disqualified under then-
operative Canon 3(E)(1) of the West Virginia and ABA Codes of
Judicial Conduct (now Rule 2.11 in the 2007 revision to the ABA
Judicial Code) in that his impartiality was subject to reasonable
question. Rule 2.11, the substance of which has been essentially the
defeated, might not do as well in practice. One common criticism of direct
election of judges is that it can result in the election of lawyers who pursue the
bench because their practices have not been successful. By contrast, nearly all
appointed judges, whatever their other talents or shortcomings, have enjoyed
success in private practice or government lawyering. For former government
lawyers, ascension to the bench may be a net gain in compensation, especially if
pension benefits and health insurance are considered.
65. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2260-61 (discussing Aetna, 475 U.S. at 825;
Ward 409 U.S. at 60; Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532).
66. Id. at 2261 (quoting Aetna, 475 U.S. at 825; Ward, 409 U.S. at 60; and
Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532).
[Vol. 29:2
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same since the 1972 Model Code, provides that "[a] judge shall
disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's
impartiality might be reasonably questioned, ' ' 6 enumerating specific
examples of when disqualification is required. 68 The ABA has in
67. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2007); see John P.
Frank, Disqualification of Judges: In Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 43 (1972) (describing history of judicial recusal and evolution
of ABA Model Code); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Chief William's Ghost: The
Problematic Persistence of the Duty to Sit, 57 BUFF. L. REv. 813 (2009) (same);
see also FLAMM, supra note , § 5.5 (2d ed. 2007) (describing the standard for
determining judicial bias); Bassett, supra note , at 1223-31 (summarizing federal
and state law on recusal).
68. Rule 2.11 listed the "following circumstances" in which the judge shall
recuse:
(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a
party's lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in
the proceeding.
(2) The judge knows that the judge, the judge's spouse or domestic
partner, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of
them, or the spouse or domestic partner of such a person is:
(a) a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, general partner,
managing member, or trustee of a party;
(b) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding.
(c) a person who has more than a de minimis interest that could be
substantially affected by the proceeding; or
(d) likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.
(3) The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or the
judge's spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child, or any other
member of the judge's family residing in the judge's household, has
an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or is a party
to the proceeding.
(4) The judge knows or learns by means of a timely motion that a party,
a party's lawyer, or the law firm of a party's lawyer, has within the
previous [insert number] year[s] made aggregate contributions to the
judge's campaign in an amount that is greater than $[insert amount]
for an individual or $ [insert amount] for an entity [is reasonable and
appropriate for an individual or an entity].
Winter 20 10]
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effect stated that in the enumerated situations, many of which seem
far less troublesome than Blankenship's campaign support of Justice
Benjamin, reasonable question as to impartiality is a given.
Impartiality is defined as the "absence of bias or prejudice in favor
of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as
maintenance of an open mind in considering issues that may come
before a judge." 69
(5) The judge, while a judge or a judicial candidate, has made a public
statement, other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or
opinion, that commits or appears to commit the judge to reach a
particular result or rule in a particular way in the proceeding or
controversy.
(6) The judge:
(a) served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or was
associated with a lawyer who participated substantially as a
lawyer in the matter during such association;
(b) served in governmental employment, and in such capacity
participated personally and substantially as a lawyer or public
official concerning the proceeding or has publically expressed in
such capacity an opinion concerning the merits of the particular
matter in controversy;
(c) was a material witness concerning the matter; or
(d) previously presided as a judge over the matter in another court.
ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.1 l(A)(l)-(6) (2007) (asterisks
for defined terms eliminated) (the terminology section of the Model Code defines
terms such as "aggregate," "domestic partner," "fiduciary, "impartiality,"
"know," and "personal knowledge"). Rule 2.11(B) requires the judge be kept
reasonably informed about his and his family's financial interests. Id. R. 2.11 (B).
Rule 2.11 (C) permits the parties to agree to the judge's continued participation in
the case, provided that there is no Rule 2.11 (A)(1) ground for disqualification on
the basis of personal bias or prejudice toward attorney or litigant or the judge's
personal knowledge of disputed facts. Id. R. 2.11 (C).
69. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Terminology Section (2007);
accord Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775-79 (2002) (noting
possible definitions of impartiality, including "openmindedness," and that "root
meaning" of impartiality "is the lack of bias for or against either party to the
proceeding"); see also id. at 775-76:
Impartiality in this sense assures equal application of the law. That is, it
guarantees a party that the judge who hears his case will apply the law to
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Case law interpreting the ABA Code's "reasonable question
regarding impartiality" standard and equivalent language in the
federal judicial code generally views a judge as disqualified if a
reasonable layperson aware of the relevant facts would harbor
significant doubt about the judge's ability to be impartial.7 °
Consequently, disqualification based on a violation of due process is
somewhat different than disqualification under the ABA Judicial
Code and state analogs or under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (the general
federal disqualification statute), which, in language similar to the
ABA Model Code, states that "[a]ny justice, judge or magistrate
judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding
in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned., 71 In a
manner similar to the Model Code's disqualification provision,
him in the same way he applies it to any other party. This is the
traditional sense in which the term is used .... It is also the sense in
which it is used in the cases cited by respondents [the State of Minnesota
defendants] and amici for the proposition that an impartial judge is
essential to due process.
(internal citations omitted).
70. See, e.g., LESLIE W. ABRAMSON, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION UNDER
CANON 3 OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 13-16 (2d ed. 1992) (providing
general discussion of the appearance of partiality); ALFINI, ET AL., supra note, Ch.
4 (providing general discussion of disqualification and conflicts of interest);
FLAMM, supra note , §§ 5.6.3, 5.7 (offering definition of the "reasonable"
layperson); Bassett, supra note , at 1238 n.127 (comparing several federal cases
dealing with the reasonable layperson); John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and
Judicial Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 243-44 (1987) (stating that a
judge should step down if there are reasonable reasons to question his or her
partiality); Stempel, supra note , at 822 ("The locus of case law on disqualification
adopts an objective reasonably informed lay observer test mandating
disqualification when [a] mythical reasonable viewer would harbor serious doubts
regarding a judge's impartiality."); see also Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition
Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 858-62 (1988) (applying this standard to disqualify federal
trial judge who sat on board of university that stood to profit from land sale if
particular party prevailed in dispute over right to build hospital); Potashnick v.
Port City Const. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that judge faced
with disqualification motion should consider how participation in a given case
appears to average citizen); United States v. Ferguson, 550 F. Supp. 1256, 1259-
60 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("The issue [of impartiality] . .. is not the Court's own
introspective capacity to sit in fair and honest judgment with respect to
controverted issues, but whether a reasonable member of the public at large, aware
of all the facts, might fairly question the Court's impartiality.").
71. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2008).
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§ 455(b) lists a number of specific instances (essentially the same as
those of the Model Code) where disqualification is required,
codifying particular circumstances that create a per se question as to
a judge's impartiality.72
Again, as with the Model Code, the particular instances
where disqualification has been required under federal statutory law
present circumstances that, for many a reasonable observer, must
seem to pose far less risk of bias than Justice Benjamin's receipt of
$3 million in campaign aid from the CEO of a litigant appearing
before him in an important case. Put another way, one might ask
which is more troubling: Justice Benjamin's situation or Mrs.
Benjamin owning a share of stock in Massey? Although the latter
should not be minimized (particularly if she owned a large amount of
stock or a significant percentage of company stock) disqualification
of Justice Benjamin would have been required had there been any
spousal stock ownership that amounted to more than a de minimis
financial interest. Yet Justice Benjamin saw no problem
participating in Caperton when the problem was not a modest
investment but instead involved $3 million in key campaign support.
Although there are some minor differences between the
Model Code and § 455(a),73 they are the same regarding the core
72. See id. § 455(b)(1)-(5) (requiring recusal in essentially the same specific
circumstances delineated in Rule 2.11 of the Model Code); ABA MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (A)(1)-(6) (listing similar factors), quoted in full supra
note 68. Section 455(e) provides that where these enumerated grounds apply, the
parties may not agree to let the judge preside but, like Rule 2.11(C), federal law
permits the parties to waive disqualification and agree to permit the judge to
preside even if his impartiality might be subject to question. 28 U.S.C. § 455(e).
73. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 455(d) defines several key terms such as
"fiduciary" and "financial interest" in the statute itself rather than referring to a
terminology section. Regarding waiver, 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) permits the parties to
agree to let a judge subject to § 455(a) hear the case but forbids such stipulations if
one of the § 455(b) grounds for recusal applies, most of which involve financial
interest of the judge or a family member. The strong federal bar to litigant consent
when a judge has even modest financial conflict is in part a legacy of now-
disparaged past practice in which a judge would announce that he owned stock in a
litigant company and then actively seek litigant consent to his continued
involvement, placing lawyers and parties in an awkward position should they
refuse to consent. See JOHN P. MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE 96-97
(1974) (discussing this situation and describing it as a game of "velvet blackjack,"
wherein a litigant "must weigh the consequences of betraying apparent distrust and
the risks of offending the other party"). The great Learned Hand, for example,
used this "velvet blackjack" approach regularly. See id. at 95-97 (detailing how
[Vol. 29:2272
HeinOnline -- 29 Rev. Litig. 272 2009-2010
JUDICIAL RECUSAL
standard governing a judge's eligibility to hear and decide cases.
Under the Judicial Code and § 455(a), the reviewing court asks
whether the judge's impartiality may be reasonably questioned.
Under a due process analysis, the inquiry is similar, but
disqualification is harder to obtain in that the Court's precedents
appear to require not just reasonable question as to impartiality but a
probability of bias. At least this appears to be the Caperton
majority's approach:
In defining these standards [for required due process
recusal rather than general disqualification] the Court
has asked whether, "under a realistic appraisal of
psychological tendencies, and human weakness," the
interest "poses such a risk of actual bias or
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the
guarantee of due process is to be adequately
implemented.
74
Applied to the instant matter, the Court found:
that there is a serious risk of actual bias-based on
objective and reasonable perceptions-when a person
with a personal stake in a particular case had a
significant and disproportionate influence in placing
Judge Hand owned twenty-five shares of Westinghouse stock and would disclose
that fact to counsel, yet litigants would never object to his participation in the
case); see also Stempel, supra note, at 631 n. 170 (describing Judge Hand's use of
"velvet blackjack" and inferring that litigants refused to ask for his recusal because
"they wanted Judge Hand's mind on the case or because they feared offending
him, or both").
However, federal law also differs from the Model Code in that § 455(f)
specifically provides that if "substantial judicial time has been devoted" to a case
when a § 455(b) problem is discovered, recusal is not required "if the justice,
judge, magistrate, bankruptcy judge, spouse or minor child, as the case may be,
divests himself or herself of the interest that provides the grounds for
disqualification." 28 U.S.C. § 455(f).
74. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263 (2009) (citing
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) and drawing upon Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Ward v.
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971);
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948);
and Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)).
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the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the
judge's election campaign when the case was pending
or imminent. The inquiry centers on the
contribution's relative size in comparison to the total
amount of money contributed to the campaign, the
total amount spent in the election, and the apparent
effect such contribution had on the outcome of the
election.
Applying this principle, we conclude that
Blankenship's campaign efforts had a significant and
disproportionate influence in placing Justice
Benjamin on the case. 75
Responding to the dissent's criticism that a decision favoring
Caperton would open the floodgates to vast tracts of recusal
litigation, the majority noted that earlier due process disqualification
decisions had not had this effect 76 and emphasized the particularities
of the instant case:
Our decision today addresses an extraordinary
situation where the Constitution requires recusal.
Massey and its amici predict that various adverse
consequences will follow from recognizing a
constitutional violation here-ranging from a flood of
recusal motions to unnecessary interference with
judicial elections. We disagree. The facts now before
us are extreme by any measure. The parties point to
no other instance involving judicial campaign
75. Id. at 2264.
76. Id. at 2266:
It is worth noting the effects, or lack thereof, of the Court's prior
decisions. Even though the standards announced in those cases raised
questions similar to those that might be asked after our decision today, the
Court was not flooded with Monroeville or Murchison motions. That is
perhaps due in part to the extreme facts those standards sought to address.
Courts proved quite capable of applying standards to less extreme
situations.
The Court also noted that the trend in state judicial reforms has strengthened
disqualification law, and cited the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct Canon
3E(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) as examples. Id.
274 [Vol. 29:2
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contributions that presents a potential for bias
comparable to the circumstances in this case.77
While acknowledging that "extreme cases often test the
bounds of established legal principles" and that "sometimes no
administrable standard may be available to address the perceived
wrong," the majority concluded that in extreme cases intervention
was required to protect the integrity of the legal system.78 Referring
to three "illustrative" past cases of such intervention, the majority
found that "[i]n each case the Court dealt with extreme facts that
created an unconstitutional probability of bias that 'cannot be
defined with precision"' but that in each case "the Court articulated
an objective standard to protect the parties' basic right to a fair trial
in a fair tribunal" with the Court "careful to distinguish the extreme
facts of the cases before it from those interests that would not rise to
a constitutional level.",
79
The Caperton majority took pains not only to state that due
process-required recusal would continue to be rare, but also that the
standard for due process recusal was distinctly higher than the
standard for ordinary disqualification:
"The Due Process Clause demarks only the
outer boundaries of judicial disqualifications.
Congress and the states, of course, remain free to
impose more rigorous standards for judicial
disqualification than those we find mandated here
today." Because the codes of judicial conduct
provide more protection than due process requires,
most disputes over disqualification will be resolved
without resort to the Constitution. Application of the
constitutional standard implicated in this case will
thus be confined to rare instances.
80
77. Id. at 2265.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2265-66 (citing Aetna, 475 U.S. at 825-26; Mayberry, 400 U.S. at
465-66; and Murchison, 349 U.S. at 137).
80. Id. at 2267 (quoting Aetna, 475 U.S. at 828). The Caperton majority
opinion can be properly criticized as less than crystal clear regarding the
differences between recusal under 28 U.S.C § 455(a) and the Judicial Code. At
times the opinion appears to suggest that the general "reasonable question as to
impartiality" standard used in nonconstitutional disqualification motions also
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Further, in announcing its campaign support recusal position,
the Court greatly emphasized whether a case was "pending" or
"imminent" at the time an interested party supported the judge under
scrutiny. 8' For example, Justice Benjamin's recusal might not have
been required had Caperton v. Massey commenced after his election,
even though Don Blankenship would be just as interested in the case
outcome and would have been just as pivotal a figure in Benjamin's
career. Further, Blankenship would have had just as much potential
to extract vengeance against Justice Benjamin if Blankenship was
displeased with Benjamin's vote. A benefactor wealthy enough to
provide $3 million presumably has the wherewithal to provide a
similar amount to a future opponent thought more hospitable to his
or his company's interests.
Given the narrowness of the Caperton holding and the
majority's repeated attempts to set the decision in a far comer of the
field of judicial disqualification, it is unsurprising that one leading
authority on judicial ethics characterized the decision as "declaring
that a judge's decision not to recuse violates due process 'when it's a
cold day in hell.' 82 Former Texas Supreme Court Chief Justice
Thomas Phillips likewise viewed Caperton as unlikely to open the
floodgates, emphasizing the majority's "very narrow standard" and
the unusual facts of the case. 3 Professor Roy Schotland, co-author
of the Chief Justices' amicus brief, called it "preposterous" to predict
an explosion of recusal motions based on Caperton.84 In particular,
as another co-author of the Chief Justices' brief observed, although
Caperton may permit more due process-based recusal arguments
than could have been made prior to June 2009, parties seeking
recusal have always possessed the option of seeking disqualification
governs the inquiry into whether due process has been violated. At other
junctures, the majority states that something more (probability of bias as opposed
to reasonable question of impartiality) is required to support recusal on due process
grounds as opposed to nonconstitutional recusal.
81. See id. at 822 (stating that a serious risk of bias exists when financial or
electoral support is provided while a case [is] "pending or imminent").
82. Caperton Ruling May Spur States to Enhance Their Process for Judges'
Recusal, 25 LAW. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 335 (2009) (quoting
University of Indiana law professor Charles Geyh).
83. Id. (quoting Phillips).
84. Id. (quoting Georgetown law professor Roy Schotland).
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based on the ABA Model Code or federal statute,85 both of which
provide broader grounds and a lower threshold for recusal.
B. The Dissenters 'Perspective in Caperton
Notwithstanding its rather restrained approach to the problem
of when failures of judicial disqualification violate due process,
Caperton divided the Court, engendering dissents by Chief Justice
Roberts (joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito) 86 and Justice
Scalia.87 The dissenters appear to have a dramatically different view
of human nature and the risk that a judge will be influenced by even
massive political and economic support by a litigant appearing
before the judge. Largely, however, the Roberts dissent attacks the
majority approach as too indeterminate and unpredictable, 88 which
the dissent contends is a sufficient problem to augur in favor of
refusing to intervene in state court disqualification decisions of this
type, no matter how bad it may look to a casual newspaper reader.89
In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts outlines a long series of
particular questions. Notwithstanding the important line-drawing
point at the center of the dissent, it appears that all of these forty
questions can be adequately addressed. 90 Although precise lines
85. Id. (quoting Washington, D.C. attorney George Patton, Jr.).
86. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia, Thomas &
Alito, JJ., dissenting).
87. Id. at 2274 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. See id. at 2269 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("[A]t the most basic level, it is
unclear whether the new probability of bias standard is somehow limited to
financial support in judicial elections, or applies to judicial recusal questions.").
Chief Justice Roberts also noted "other fundamental questions as well" and listed
forty such questions, eighty if one counts subparts. Id. at 2269-74; see discussion
supra note.
89. Id. at 2267 ("The Court's new 'rule' provides no guidance to judges and
litigants about when recusal will be constitutionally required. This will inevitably
lead to an increase in allegations that judges are biased, however groundless those
charges may be. The end result will do far more to erode public confidence in
judicial impartiality than an isolated failure to recuse in a particular case.").
90. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Playing Forty Questions: A Brief Response to
Justice Roberts' Concerns in Caperton and Some Tentative Answers About
Operationalizing Judicial Recusal and Due Process, 39 SOUTHWESTERN L. REV.
(forthcoming Dec. 2009) (responding to Roberts's questions); see also Caperton
Ruling May Spur States, supra note , at 5 (law professor Charles Geyh, a Reporter
for the 2007 ABA Model Judicial Code, describing concerns raised in the Roberts
dissent questions as "alarmist," contending there is only "remote" risk of
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cannot be drawn in the absence of concrete cases, a series of
presumptive guidelines suggest themselves for application of due
process disqualification.91  One might also criticize the Roberts
dissent for engaging in a bit of "straw man" argumentation 92 in that it
announces an unnecessary goal (laying out an encyclopedic view of
due process qualification that enunciates particularized rules of
application for every conceivable future dispute on the matter)93 and
then criticizes the majority for not meeting the dissenters' perhaps
unwise goal. In another context, judicial conservatives like Justices
difficulties concerning the dissenters); id. at 4 (law professor Schotland viewing
dissent's prediction of doom as "preposterous" but conceding that the Roberts
dissent posed some reasonable questions that may need to be answered in future
cases).
91. See Stempel, supra note , at text accompanying notes 81-85 (laying out
recusal guidelines including "where a judge had a 'direct, substantial pecuniary
interest' in a case, ... a financial interest in the outcome of a case," or where a
judge was challenged "because of a conflict arising from his participation in an
earlier proceeding").
92. Straw man is defined as "[a] tenuous and exaggerated counterargument
that an advocate puts forth for the sole purpose of disproving it." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1461 (8th ed. 2004). Having erected a straw man that is less
attractive or compelling than the actual argument opposed, the speaker then
proceeds to "knock down" this weaker target but in doing so is largely destroying
something other than the argument that was supposed to be at issue.
93. During the past decade, the concept of judicial minimalism has gained a
substantial following. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME:
JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999) (exploring the connection
between judicial minimalism and democratic self-government); Christopher J.
Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454 (2000)
(explaining that a resurgence in judicial minimalism has been endorsed by former
and current judges and has sparked scholarly debate); Jay D. Wexler, Defending
the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 298 (1998) (explaining the virtues of judicial minimalism). The concept has
also become part of the public discussion surrounding Judge Sonia Sotomayor's
nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court. See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Judge's
Mentor: Part Guide, Part Foil, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2009, at Al (portraying
Judge Sotomayor as a judicial minimalist and quoting former Yale Law Dean and
Second Circuit Judge Guido Calabresi, who described Sotomayor's approach in a
controversial case as one of "judicial minimalism"). This is an image the Obama
administration appeared interested in promoting in order to help her ultimately
successful confirmation by refuting charges that she was a judicial activist. See
Richard Brust, No More Kabuki Confirmations, A.B.A. J. Oct. 2009 at 39 (noting
emphasis in Sotomayor confirmation and others in presenting nominee as simply
work-a-day judge following the law).
[Vol. 29:2
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Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito might well label such a project as
an impermissible advisory opinion.
94
In addition to questioning the feasibility of Supreme Court
policing of campaign-related state court failures to recuse, the
Roberts dissent is a utilitarian attack, contending that whatever
benefit is derived from correcting Justice Benjamin's ethical myopia
is outweighed by the anticipated avalanche of less meritorious
disqualification motions, both because it will add to judicial
workload and because it will create in the public unfounded concern
about the neutrality of judges. 95 Concluding, Chief Justice Roberts
expressed his view that "opening the door to [due process-based]
recusal claims" based on an "amorphous 'probability of bias,' will
itself bring our judicial system into undeserved disrepute, and
94. Under the ground rules of justiciability, courts (in particular the U.S.
Supreme Court), are to refrain from rendering advisory opinions. See JOHN E.
NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.12 (7th ed. 2004)
(providing overview of justiciability doctrines and general prohibition on advisory
opinions). Conservative jurists are generally viewed as particularly supportive of
this doctrine because it tends to reduce the degree to which judicial decisions may
amplify or contradict actions of the legislative or executive branch. See
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (prominent conservative law professor argues for use
of justiciability and related doctrines to prevent Court from becoming involved in
policy choices better left to other branches of government); RICHARD A. BRISBIN,
JR., JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE CONSERVATIVE REVIVAL 328 (1997)
(noting Scalia's use of doctrines such as justiciability to reduce federal court
involvement in cases involving issues of public policy); Ernest A. Young, Judicial
Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1204-05 (2002)
(applying this analysis to "institutional" conservative judges but finding that
"political" conservative justice may be quite willing to interfere with legislation
they oppose ideologically). But see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and
Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL. L. REV. 393,
458-60 (1996) (noting that during New Deal era liberal justices invoked
justiciability concepts in attempt to restrain Supreme Court from interfering with
legislation); Daniel C. Hulsebosch, The New Deal Court: Emergence of a New
Reason, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 2016 (1990) (same).
95. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267, 2272-73
(2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (stressing presumption of judicial impartiality
and need to foster respect for courts as well as citing "cautionary tale" of Court's
short-lived willingness to permit double jeopardy attacks in civil litigation, leading
to many novel claims that forced retreat on the issue and confinement of double
jeopardy issues to criminal proceedings).
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diminish the confidence of the American people in the fairness and
integrity of their courts."
96
Justice Scalia's lone dissent expressed similar cost-benefit
concerns in more strident terms. Rejecting the contention that there
was a net benefit to setting aside the tainted Massey victory, Justice
Scalia argued that the majority "decision will have the opposite
effect."97  He contended, without benefit of any cited empirical
evidence, that:
[w]hat above all else is eroding public confidence in
the Nation's judicial system is the perception that
litigation is just a game, that the party with the most
resourceful lawyer can play it to win, that our
seemingly interminable legal proceedings are
wonderfully self-perpetuating but incapable of
delivering real-world justice. 98
According to Justice Scalia, the majority opinion "will
reinforce that perception, adding to the fast arsenal of lawyerly
gambits what will come to be known as the Caperton claim" 99
producing an attendant sharp rise in disputing costs and further drain
on the judicial system. 1° To Justice Scalia, "[t]he relevant question
... is whether we do more good than harm by seeking to correct this
imperfection through expansion of our constitutional mandate in a
manner ungoverned by any discernable rule [and the] answer is
obvious. 1
96. Id. at 2274.
97. Id. at 2274-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 2274.
99. Id.
100. Id. ("The facts relevant to adjudicating it will have to be litigated-and
likewise the law governing it, which will be indeterminate for years to come, if not
forever. Many billable hours will be spent in poring through volumes of campaign
finance reports, and many more in contesting non-recusal decisions through every
available means.").
101. Id. at 2275.
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C. The Unpersuasive Criticisms of Caperton
Although commentators generally approved the Caperton
holding,10 2 several prominent commentators, echoing the arguments
of the dissents, challenged its prudence and practicality, as well as
the correctness of its decision to vacate the West Virginia Supreme
Court's decision in which the justice receiving $3 million in
campaign support cast the deciding vote.10 3  Initial criticisms of
102. See, e.g., Editorial, Honest Justice, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2009, at A22
(praising Caperton holding, its "recognition of the threat posed by outsize
contributions," and its "crucial statement that judges and justice are not for sale"
while finding problems raised by Roberts dissent "exaggerated"); Editorial, No
tolerance for bias; Supreme Court issues sound ruling that instructs judges to
remain impartial, LAS VEGAS SuN, June 11, 2009, at 4 (arguing that "Justice
Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority, used common sense" and praising the
Court for being "appropriately careful not to put all contributors to judicial
campaigns in the same basket. The decision that judges should recuse themselves
applies only to cases in which an interested party was a substantial campaign
contributor."); Editorial, The Supreme Court raises the bar for judges, L.A. TIMES,
June 9, 2009, at A18 (approving Caperton holding and finding Roberts's dissent
"wrong to bewail a decision that will force judges, including members of his own
court, to take apparent conflicts of interest more seriously").
103. See, e.g., Editorial, Judges and 'Bias': The Supremes Trample on State
Courts, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2009, at A18 ("The march away from a credible,
accountable judiciary took another leap yesterday."); Editorial, Judicial
Impartiality: Decision Could Cause More Problems than it Solves, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J., June 11, 2009, at 6B (Caperton "ruling unfortunately fails to define at
what level recusal is mandatory-leaving the field wide open for all kinds of new
court challenges as creative lawyers put 'judge shopping' on steroids."); Hoppy
Kercheval, The High Court Made Hash of the Bias Issue; Supreme Supremes Have
Actually Eroded Confidence in Courts, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, June 16, 2009,
at A4 (arguing that the court's decision in Caperton was too vague to be a guide
for recusal); Political Cartoon, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., June 9, 2009, at 9B
(Underneath text stating "News Item: U.S. Supreme Court rules that elected
judges must recuse themselves in cases where large campaign contributions might
create the perception of bias" is picture of litigant attempting to enter courtroom
but stopped at toll booth by guard stating, "Hey-it's now the only way the judge
can rake in a few campaign bucks."); see also David Kihara, Court Rules on
Elected Judges, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., June 9, 2009, at IA (including phrases
"Opinion: Recusal might be need to avoid appearance of bias" and "Dissenters see
downside to ruling," and also attributing to State Bar president that "it's very
common for parties to complain that a judge is biased, but it's rarely true," and
quoting law professor that lawyers will "push the envelope" with Caperton recusal
claims).
The Wall Street Journal editorial, in addition to trumpeting states' rights
federalism ("[r]ecusal standards are better handled at the state level, where
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individual judges are presumed to be impartial in their courtrooms. ... Allowing
federal courts to second-guess state judges opens the door to unprecedented federal
meddling."), followed the Roberts dissent script of raising concerns of
unpredictability and arbitrariness in the application of Caperton-style recusal:
Heretofore, judges needed to recuse themselves on due process
grounds only if they had a direct financial interest in a case, and in
criminal contempt cases in which the judge provoked the original
courtroom outburst. Under Justice Anthony Kennedy's Caperton
standard, judges must now recuse if there is a "probability of bias." But
this would seem to be open to, well, judicial interpretation....
In his dissent, Chief Justice John Roberts lists 40 questions that
represent only "a few uncertainties that quickly come to mind." The
majority opinion "requires state and federal judges simultaneously to act
as political scientists (why did candidate X win the election?), economists
(was the financial support disproportionate?) and psychologists (is there
likely to be a debt of gratitude?)."
[The majority's attempt] to limit any judicial chaos [by
characterizing Caperton as a rare case is unpersuasive and] ... support
for this position by such opponents of judicial elections as the Brennan
Center for Justice and the George Soros-funded Justice at Stake gives
away the game.
... The ultimate goal of these groups is to have all judges selected by
a club of lawyers and insiders that makes judges less accountable to
average citizens.
See Judges and 'Bias'supra, at A18.
Responding to the Journal editorial lies beyond the scope of this article, but
the editorial demands at least a brief reply regarding its fallacious premise.
According to the Journal, appointed judges are antidemocratic and deprive the
"average citizen" of voice. But as reflected in the actual facts of Caperton (rather
than the Journal's imaginary view of the world), the mythical average citizen had
far less to do with Justice Benjamin's election than did $3 million contributor Don
Blankenship. Fears of insider dominance in an appointed judiciary are of course
legitimate. But could any insider's club of the legal establishment be smaller than
one wealthy corporate CEO? The Journal's attack on Caperton, to use the
Journal's own words, "gives away the game."
See also Editorial, Bias on the Bench; The Supreme Court weighs in on the
corrosive impact of money in judicial elections, WASH. POST, June 10, 2009, at
A18 (taking a relatively moderate and balanced view that the Caperton decision
"raised more questions than it answered, but it should serve as a call for states to
tighten judicial ethics standards and rethink judicial elections altogether."); Dahlia
Lithwick, The Great Caperton Caper; The Supreme Court talks about judicial
bias. Kinda., SLATE, June 8, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2220031 (noting
apparent introspection of majority opinion and its retreat from traditional
mythology that judging is a formal process detached from personal experiences
and views, finding portion of the opinion "strikingly resonant with [Supreme Court
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Caperton fall roughly into three categories: (1) states' rights
federalism; (2) concerns about limits on free expression in elections;
and (3) questions about practical problems with Caperton.
1. States' Rights Federalism
The states' rights critique argues that Caperton, by expanding
federal constitutional scrutiny of state court proceedings via the Due
Process Clause, intrudes too greatly into a core state function of
adjudication. Justice Scalia's dissent states this most strongly 0 4 but
there are elements in the Roberts dissent as well. 10 5 Justices Scalia
and Thomas have been reasonably consistent on this point in that
they also have steadily resisted the Court's expanded review of state
court punitive damages judgments for compliance with due
process. 106 In its simplest form, their view is that the Constitution
should not be used as a roving license to correct state court error.
While the occasional adjudication by judges who should have
recused or the ridiculously large punitive damages award may be
regrettable, these are seen by Justices Scalia and Thomas largely as
nominee Judge Sonia] Sotomayor's much-maligned Berkeley speech, about how
the average judge goes about deciding a case," and asking whether including
"empathy" in factors relevant to judicial outcomes can be far behind).
104. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2274-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
principal consequence of today's decision is to create vast uncertainty with respect
to a point of law that can be raised in all litigated cases in (at least) those 39 states
that elect their judges .... The Court today continues its quixotic quest to right all
wrongs and repair all imperfections through the Constitution.").
105. See id. at 2267-68 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("Court's new 'rule'
provides no guidance to judges and litigants about when recusal will be
constitutionally required.").
106. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,
429 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Due Process Clause provides no
substantive protections against 'excessive' or 'unreasonable' awards of punitive
damages."); id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("I continue to believe that the
Constitution does not constrain the size of punitive damages awards."); BMW of
N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 598 (1996) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("Today we see the latest manifestation of this Court's recent and
increasingly insistent 'concern about punitive damages that run wild.' Since the
Constitution does not make that concern any of our business, the Court's activities
in this area are an unjustified incursion into the province of state governments."
(internal citation omitted)).
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mere error-and the U.S. Supreme Court's role is not to correct error
but to resolve questions of federal and constitutional law.'
0 7
The Scalia-Thomas perspective has much to recommend it
and may strike a particularly responsive chord with those who found
the Court's punitive damages precedents problematic. 1°8 There are
even some signs that the Court, which intervened to save large
businesses from punitive damages awards it disliked,'0 9 has been
partially moved by their concerns. The Court recently declined to
review an $80 million punitive damages award in a tobacco liability
case after initially expressing interest.110 Roving Court intervention
pursuant to the Due Process Clause could, at worst, become the
substitution of the judgment of five justices for that of an entire state
court system (jury, trial judge, appellate panel, and state supreme
court). Even if prudently invoked, due process review on what
essentially are fairness grounds arguably misapplies scarce judicial
resources.
107. See, e.g., BMW, 517 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee reasonable
damages); State Farm, 538 U.S. at 429-30 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting)
(finding no limit to punitive damages in the constitution).
108. See Thomas Galligan, Jr., Disaggregating More-Than- Whole Damages
in Personal Injury Law: Deterrence and Punishment, 71 TENN. L. REv. 117 (2003)
(criticizing Court's foray into punitive damages field); see also JEFFREY W.
STEMPEL, LITIGATION ROAD: THE STORY OF CAMPBELL V. STATE FARM chs. 22-
25 (2008) (suggesting that Court's decision to vacate large punitive damages
award for insurer bad faith failed to appreciate length, magnitude, willfulness, and
wrongfulness of insurer's behavior).
109. See Exxon v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (vacating $2.5 billion
punitive damages award in oil spill case and, in essence, capping maximum award
at $500 million); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007) (vacating
$79.5 million punitive damages award in tobacco product liability and fraud
claim); State Farm, 538 U.S. at 408 (vacating $145 million punitive damages
award against insurer in bad faith claim); BMW, 517 U.S. at 559 (vacating $4
million dollar punitive damages award against major automobile manufacturer for
failing to disclose touch-up paint job on new car); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512
U.S. 415 (1994) (overturning $5 million punitive damages award in product
liability case).
110. Phillip Morris, 549 U.S. at 346. After the 2007 remand of this case,
the Oregon Supreme Court reaffirmed its support for the jury's $80 million
punitive damages award, prompting the tobacco company to again seek U.S.
Supreme Court review. See Williams v. Phillip Morris Inc., 176 P.3d 1255, 1263
(Or. 2008) (reaffirming the damages award against the tobacco company). After
granting certiorari, the Court subsequently dismissed the writ as improvidently
granted. See Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, 129 S. Ct. 1436 (2009) (mem.).
[Vol. 29:2284
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But if the states' rights critique of Caperton is correct, it
argues for declining to ever overturn a state court decision on
disqualification grounds. Once the Court's majority has determined
that due process concerns permit some policing of state outcomes
involving improperly participating jurists, the Rubicon has been
crossed. The Court will be intervening in some state proceeding
where a judge has failed to recuse. Indeed, the Court has been
engaged in some form of this enterprise since the 1927 Tumey v.
Ohio decision"' and has steadily, if infrequently, intervened to
vindicate fairness concerns for more than 80 years in cases like Ward
v. Monroeville,112 and Aetna v. Lavoie,113 which arguably involved
far less judicial self-interest and threat to public confidence than that
faced by Justice Benjamin in Caperton.1'14
The issue is not whether the Due Process Clause permits the
policing of judicial impartiality. That question is now settled, by
however slim a vote, in favor of giving the Court at least the power
to intervene. Logically as well, the guarantee of due process, if it is
to mean anything, must mean that citizens of the states will not be
subject to "kangaroo courts" where judges are viewed as
compromised or even corrupt because of the substantial campaign
support they have received from litigants or lawyers. 115
111. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531-32 (1927) (finding due process
violation where mayor presided over alcohol violations court where funds from
fines he imposed funded the court and supplemented his salary).
112. See Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 59-60 (1972) (finding due
process violation where mayor presided over court that imposed fines that became
part of general town funds and stating that mayor's pecuniary interest in case
outcomes was too great even though his salary was not directly increased or
funded by fines collected).
113. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 824 (1986) (finding
due process violation where Alabama Supreme Court justice whose case-deciding
vote against insurer in bad faith case himself had pending bad faith action
presenting similar issues in claim against different insurer and where justice could
create favorable precedent that would enhance his monetary claim in violation of
constitutional fairness).
114. See also Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 564-65 (1973) (holding
that administrative board of optometrists had sufficient financial interest in cases
involving competing optometrists to violate due process in board's adjudication of
claims against competitors).
115. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Keeping Arbitrations From Becoming
Kangaroo Courts, 8 NEV. L.J. 251, 256 (2007) (setting forth definition of term
"kangaroo court" and discussing its origin).
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The relevant question that should concern the judiciary going
forward is the standard that should be used in guiding the Court's
occasional interventions. Caperton's "probability of bias" standard,
although a seemingly higher threshold than simple error in recusal, is
sufficiently malleable that it provides relatively little protection to
the states' rights concerns of the dissenters. The Court nonetheless
retains the power to upset a state court decision using an
unacceptable risk of bias standard just as it could vacate a state court
decision using a reasonable question as to impartiality standard.
Further, because the unacceptable risk of bias standard is
apparently reserved only for due process disqualification matters
rather than judicial recusal generally, it also creates the problem of
applying a different standard, seldom deployed, while adoption of
the more straightforward reasonable question as to impartiality,
error-in-recusal standard provides the court with a far larger body of
precedent for determining the propriety of a judge's refusal to
recuse.
Adoption of the broader but more familiar "reasonable
question as to impartiality" standard for assessing due process
violations can provide greater consistency without leading to the
flood of litigation feared by the Caperton dissenters. As outlined at
greater length below, the power to intervene in non-disqualification
cases is, like all the Supreme Court's power, almost entirely
discretionary. 116  In Caperton, the majority tacitly used
considerations for intervention suggested in the Chief Justices'
brief.117 If combined with the additional considerations set forth in
this article, 1 8 the Court would possess a template adequate for
continuing to vindicate due process fairness where necessary without
becoming a court of omnibus error correction in disqualification
matters.
116. See ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 220-21 (8th
ed. 2002) (stating that the Judiciary Act of 1925 gave the Supreme Court "firm
control over the main body of its work").
117. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263-64
(2009) (utilizing the approach advocated in the chief justices' amicus brief of
assessing factors such as relative size of campaign contribution, magnitude of
election spending, and impact of contribution to determine whether campaign
support was sufficient to raise due process concerns).
118. See infra Part IV.E.2.
[Vol. 29:2286
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2. Limits on Free Expression
The free expression objection to Caperton contends that the
decision conflicts with Court precedent resisting certain types of
electoral regulation due to First Amendment concerns. Caperton is
thus seen as in some tension with Buckley v. Valeo;119 Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White, which struck down at least a portion of
efforts to restrict campaign activity on constitutional grounds; 120 and
New York State Board of Elections v. Lopez Torres, which upheld
the challenged state procedures but reiterated the concerns expressed
in Buckley and White.121 These cases can be read as standing for the
proposition that the constitutional right of free speech in the political
arena makes all but the most narrowly tailored restrictions on
campaign activity impermissible. In particular, because Buckley v.
Valeo found campaign contributions to be a form of protected
speech, it would seem to support Massey's argument that it should
not be penalized (by having a favorable decision vacated) merely
because it expressed its support for one of the jurists through
campaign contributions.
The persuasiveness of the free expression critique of
Caperton lies in the eye of the beholder. To those favoring wide
open campaigning and tending to dislike any regulation of the
process, Caperton is indeed in some tension with prior caselaw.
However, unlike New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, which provided a
zone of liability protection for the news media, 122 the "electoral
freedom" First Amendment cases are regarded as problematic by
many observers. Many have long harbored concerns that Buckley v.
119. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58 (1976) (striking down certain
limits on campaign contributions and activity as violating the First Amendment).
120. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 789 (2002)
(striking down Minnesota judicial code's "announce" clause prohibiting candidate
from stating position on legal issues and past court decisions as violative of First
Amendment).
121. See N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 798
(2008) (discussing a state's power to proscribe party use of primaries or
conventions as "not without limits").
122. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding
that First Amendment set constitutional limits on prosecution of defamation
matters, including requirement that if defamation plaintiff is a public figure such as
a politician, recovery can be had only if media defendant knew published
statement defaming plaintiff was false or acted with "reckless disregard" of its
truth or falsity).
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Valeo was wrongly decided and helped foster significant electoral
pathology, including special interest group domination of American
politics by monied interests. 123  Republican Party v. White, like
Caperton, was a 5-4 decision that many view as having accelerated
the trend to judicial elections that look more like All the King's
Men124 or American Idol and less like reflective selection of serious
jurists. 125  At a minimum, one can answer the free expression
123. See, e.g., Robert F. Bauer, The Demise of Reform: Buckley v. Valeo,
the Courts and the "Corruption Rationale," 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 11 (1998)
(pointing to Courts' refusal to close "loopholes" allowing "today's 'issue ads'
financed by special interest groups with soft money"); Peter M. Shane,
Commentary, Back to the Future of the American State: Overruling Buckley v.
Valeo and Other Madisonian Steps, 57 U. PITT. L. REv. 443 (1996) (stating that
contributions "facilitate corrupt quid pro quo arrangements between candidates
and special interests"); J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money
Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976) (asserting that the campaign reform legislation
reviewed in Buckley can be seen as an attempt to free decision makers "from
imperative obligations to special interest money-providers."). One commentator
has even characterized Buckley v. Valeo as the U.S. Supreme Court's "worst"
decision ever. Sanford Levinson, Parliamentarianism, Progressivism, and 1937:
Some Reservations About Professor West's Aspirational Constitution, 88 Nw. U.
L. REv. 283,292 (1993).
124. See ROBERT PENN WARREN, ALL THE KING'S MEN (1946) (describing
rough-and-tumble world of electoral politics in novel presenting main character
similar to Louisiana govemor Huey P. Long); see also EDWIN O'CONNOR, THE
LAST HURRAH (1956) (a thinly veiled portrayal of Boston Mayor James Michael
Curley).
125. See, e.g., Jessica Gall, Living with Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White: The Birth and Death of Judicial Campaign Speech Restrictions, 13 COMM.
L. & POL'Y 97 (2008) (discussing judicial canons regulating behavior of judicial
candidates as a limitation on the information voters can obtain to make informed
decisions); Leita Walker, Protecting Judges from White's Aftermath: How the
Public-Employee Speech Doctrine Might Help Judges and the Courts in Which
They Work, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHicS 371 (2007) (indicating that White's holding
that Minnesota's "announce clause" was unconstitutional threatens "a
comprehensive loss of public faith in the capacity of elected judges" to act fairly
and impartially). The dissents in White, of course, also take this view. See 536
U.S. at 803 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting)
("[D]isposition of this case on the flawed premise that the criteria for the election
to judicial office should mirror the rules applicable to political elections is
profoundly misguided."); id. at 821 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Stevens, Souter &
Breyer, JJ., dissenting) ("For more than three-quarters of a century, States like
Minnesota have endeavored, through experiment tested by experience, to balance
the constitutional interests in judicial integrity and free expression within the
unique setting of an elected judiciary .... [Reasonable restrictions on judicial
candidate speech are] an essential component in Minnesota's accommodation of
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critique of Caperton by invoking the Due Process Clause, which has
at least as much historical pedigree and power as the First
Amendment.
But, like the states' rights concern about Caperton, the free
expression issue affects only the question of whether the Supreme
Court should even become involved with review of disqualification
matters. Once the Court does so (as it has for approximately 80
years), some sort of standard for intervention is required. Requiring
something more than mere error below arguably reduces such
intervention and correspondingly reduces the posited free expression
or states' rights "harm." But there is no way of knowing whether an
"unacceptable risk of bias" standard will result in significantly fewer
interventions than a "reasonable question as to impartiality"
standard. Certainly, a reasonable reader of U.S. Supreme Court
decisions can be forgiven for being unsure of whether Caperton's
undue risk of bias standard is in practice much different from a
simple rule that improper failure to recuse violates due process-at
least if the Court finds the failure sufficiently egregious.'
26
the complex and competing concerns in this sensitive area." (internal citation
omitted)).
126. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775-76
(2002) (noting the argument made by state defending limitations on judicial
candidate speech and its supporters "that an impartial judge is essential to due
process"). Justice Scalia, the author of White, then summarizes the precedents
invoked as follows:
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523, 531-534 (1927) (judge violated due
process by sitting in a case in which it would be in his financial interest to
find against one of the parties); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S.
813, 822-825 (same); Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 58-62 (1972)
(same); Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 215-216 (1971) (per
curiam) (judge violated due process by sitting in a case in which one of
the parties was a previously successful litigant against him); Bracey v.
Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 905 (1997) (would violate due process if a judge
was disposed to rule against defendants who did not bribe him in order to
cover up the fact that he regularly ruled in favor of defendants who did
bribe him); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137-139 (1955) (judge
violated due process by sitting in the criminal trial of defendant whom he
had indicted).
Id. at 776 (parallel citations and italics removed).
Reviewing this summary of the established pre-Caperton case law concerning
recusal required on due process grounds, one is struck by the difficulty of
determining whether the Court has historically imposed due process recusal
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In the end, it will still be the Court's case-specific exercise of
discretion that determines whether cases like Caperton are rare or
relatively common on the Court's docket. Weighed against any
possible reduction in federal intrusion that would presumably please
the Caperton dissenters are the questions of application surrounding
the probability of bias standard, which also troubled the dissenters.
If the Court is to be in the due process disqualification business in
any event, employment of a yardstick for review that comports with
the general recusal standard promises the prospect of more consistent
application, perhaps with no greater frequency of Court intervention.
3. Practical Problems of Implementation
The practical problems critique of Caperton, which is the
focus of the Roberts dissent, 127 argues more directly that expanded
due process review of disqualification decisions will substantially
increase the workload of the Supreme Court and other courts, in
large part because of the alleged difficulty of determining when an
unacceptable risk of actual bias exists. To a degree, the practical
problems criticism of Caperton is an argument that the Court should
not police state court disqualification failures at all. 128 Like the free
expression and states' rights criticisms of Caperton, this part of the
practical problems critique is not relevant to the question of what test
should be used in determining when non-disqualification violates
due process. Hard-core critics of Caperton do not want the Court in
the recusal review business at all, save perhaps only in cases of very
direct personal financial interest and matters in which the judge was
also effectively the accuser of a litigant.' 
29
because the judge's impartiality was subject to question or whether it was
requiring that, beyond this, the reasonable lay viewer must also think that the judge
is "probably" biased or prejudiced. If the Caperton dissenters (such as Justice
Scalia) are correct that the due process recusal standard lacks sufficient clarity, this
appears to be a problem that predates Caperton.
127. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267-74
(2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that due process review of
disqualification will increase court caseloads); see also supra Part III.B, discussing
Roberts's dissent.
128. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2274 ("[S]ometimes the cure is worse than
the disease.").
129. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (joined by
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.) ("Until today, we have recognized exactly two
situations in which the Federal Due Process Clause requires disqualification of a
290 [Vol. 29:2
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But, as with the other critiques of Caperton, the hard-core
practicality critique appears to be fighting a rearguard action.
Although pre-Caperton cases had not dealt specifically with
campaign support in judicial elections and arguably only involved
direct financial stakes, cases like Aetna v. Lavoie' 30 and Gibson v.
Berryhill,13 1 if read realistically, show that the Court has for decades
been willing to set aside cases involving compromised jurists even if
the judge's interest in a matter was attenuated and did not directly
implicate payment of funds to the judge. Once the Tumey Court132
correctly found that doubts about a judge's neutrality implicated the
Due Process Clause, there was logically no turning back and the
Court has correspondingly refused to turn back (although its frequent
judge: when the judge has a financial interest in the outcome of the case, and
when the judge is trying a defendant for certain criminal contempts. Vaguer
notions of bias or the appearance of bias were never a basis for disqualification,
either at common law or under our constitutional precedents. Those issues were
instead addressed by legislation or court rules. Today, however, the Court enlists
the Due Process Clause to overturn a judge's failure to recuse because of a
'probability of bias.' Unlike the established grounds for disqualification, a
'probability of bias' cannot be defined in any limited way.") (italics in original);
Editorial, Judges and "Bias," WALL ST. J., June 9, 2009 at 18A (condemning
Caperton decision as providing unprecedented and unwise federal oversight of
state courts and representing liberal groups' agenda for seeking to eliminate
elective judgeships); Bradley A. Smith & Jeff Patch, Can Congress Regulate All
Political Speech, WALL ST. J., March 3, 2009 at 13A (contending that those
seeking recusal of Justice Benjamin in Caperton improperly and unconstitutionally
attempt to ban political participation through independent campaign expenditures).
See also Editorial, On the money: Our view-Efforts to buy justice should be
thwarted, ST. LouIs POST-DISPATCH, June 9, 2009 at A12 (defending Caperton
holding and accusing right-wing political forces "cheered on by the Federalist
Society and The Wall Street Journal editorial page" of attempting to politicize
judicial selection process).
130. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986) (holding
that state court justice's participation in case violated due process not because he
was or would be directly compensated by either litigant but because his decision
could result in court precedent favorable to him in a pending insurance coverage
and bad faith case presenting similar issues).
131. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 581 (1973) (due process was
violated where administrative board of optometrists conducted regulatory-
disciplinary hearings involving competing optometrists).
132. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927), discussed supra at text
accompanying notes -.
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5-4 decisions on matters of judicial ethics do not place this beyond
the realm of possibility).'33
For purposes of this article, the relevant question regarding
the practical problems attack on Caperton, like the states' rights and
free expression attacks, is the content of the standard for determining
when judicial non-disqualification violates due process. Of all the
criticisms of Caperton, the practical problems attack is most easily
accommodated by this article's suggestion that it be considered a due
process problem whenever a state jurist erroneously fails to recuse.
The potentially broader scope of this standard (as compared to
Caperton's probability of bias standard) may lead to more litigation,
but the litigation can be more easily resolved because the standard is
clearer, easier to apply, informed by more precedent and experience,
and-like the probability of bias standard-still requires the support
of at least four justices before it can become a basis for overturning a
state court judgment.
Consequently, whatever the merits of the arguments of
Caperton critics on the "should the Court be doing this at all?"
question, there is no reason not to use the most efficacious test for
policing state court non-disqualification once the Court has entered
the thicket in the first place. At least until the working five-justice
majority of Caperton shifts or the Court abandons due process
disqualification review in general, it should use the better standard of
reasonable question as to a state court jurist's impartiality.
D. The Correctness of the Caperton Holding and the
Legitimacy of Concerns about It
Notwithstanding the criticisms, Caperton was clearly
correctly decided on the merits of the case itself. Although, as J.
Paul Getty famously remarked, "a billion dollars isn't what it used to
be,"'1 34 three million dollars (the amount West Virginia Justice Brent
Benjamin received in campaign support from Massey CEO Don
133. In addition to Caperton, other 5-4 decisions concerning judicial ethics
include Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002); Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994) (although there was no dissent, five justices
were in the majority and four joined the concurring opinion); and Liljeberg v.
Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
134. Stephanie Mansfield, Billionaire Behavior, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Nov. 8, 1992, at 5D.
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Blankenship) remains a lot of money, particularly to a lawyer
seeking election to statewide judicial office. 135 Fifty million dollars,
the amount at stake in Massey's case, is even more money.
Allowing Justice Benjamin to sit in judgment on Massey's appeal
and to cast the deciding vote in favor of Massey looks too much like
a bribe to be countenanced by a system that aspires to judicial
impartiality. Even non-alarmist laypersons (who do not see every
campaign contribution as a quid-for-future-quo) would reasonably be
alarmed to see such large sums directed by an interested litigant to a
single judge pivotal to the resolution of the litigant's large case. As
well-put in a leading magazine, Justice Benjamin "found he was
unbiased after deliberating with himself"; "[w]hat happened in West
Virginia would have been unthinkable in most other countries."' 
36
Lawyers, even if more jaded than lay observers about the
world of judicial politics, might have additional reason to question
the neutrality of Justice Benjamin (and the West Virginia Court 3-2
majority in the case). The majority's legal grounds for granting
victory to Massey rested on what many, if not most, observers would
deem a strained view of both res judicata and enforcement of
arbitration clauses.1 37  Although the majority's legal rationale for
135. Although Brent Benjamin, Esq., appears to have been a reasonably
successful private practitioner, there is nothing in his background to suggest that
he had the large personal wealth that certain "superlawyers" (e.g., the late Johnnie
Cochran, Mark Geragos, Joe Jamail, Fred Bartlitt, or David Boies) might bring
with them to an election campaign-the type of personal wealth that could
arguably place them beyond potential dependence on campaign supporters.
136. The Caperton v. Massey case: Not for sale, THE ECONOMIST, June 13,
2009, at 80.
137. See supra note and accompanying text (discussing the forum selection
and res judicata issues in Caperton).
On remand, the West Virginia Court declined to decide the res judicata issue
and focused on the forum selection argument, again holding-this time by a 4-1
vote-that the choice of forum clause in the Wellmore-Harman Mining coal sales
contract, which specified Buchanan County, Virginia, as the location for trial of
any contract disputes, was sufficiently broad to require that all of Caperton's West
Virginia claims be brought along with Harman Mining's earlier successful action
against Wellmore for breach of contract. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal. Co.,
Inc., 2009 W. Va. LEXIS 107 (W. Va., Nov. 12, 2009).
Although the Court's ruling is perhaps defensible, it is a very broad, literalist
reading of a clause designed to ensure merely that all contract-related disputes
between the parties be tried in a particular location. Although Wellmore's breach
of the Harman Mining contract was a significant part of the Massey strategy for
wresting the Harman Mine from Caperton, many would find it a stretch to label
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saving Massey from a multi-million dollar adverse judgment may
not have been completely laughable, neither was it clearly correct
nor even within the mainstream of preclusion law or arbitration
law. 138 Further, even the West Virginia Justices supporting Massey
conceded that the trial record reflected predatory conduct by
Massey. 13 9 In other words, Massey's victory was based on what a
Massey's entire campaign, including alleged bad faith and deceit and many actions
apart from the breach of the Wellmore contract, to be a matter sufficiently "in
connection with" the Harman coal sales contract to Wellmore that it required
erasing Caperton's $50 million victory against Massey.
Cynics might be forgiven for concluding that the Court's resolute adherence to
its earlier forum selection clause ruling was perhaps motivated by defensiveness
about the U.S. Supreme Court's disqualification of Justice Benjamin and implicit
indictment of the West Virginia Court's recusal practices.
138. Id.
139. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 265 (W. Va.
2008) (Albright, J., joined by Cookman, J., dissenting) (noting that entire state
supreme court appeared to agree with trial court finding that Massey engaged in
illegal predatory and fraudulent behavior but bemoaning the majority's
unwillingness to state this explicitly in its second decision on the merits), revd,
129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009):
This case is before the Court on rehearing granted after the five
elected Justices on the Court, while disagreeing about the proper ultimate
outcome of the case, unanimously agreed that defendant "Massey's
conduct warranted the type of judgment rendered [below] in this
case."
Today's "new" opinion of the Court rests on the same indefensible
legal grounds [regarding forum selection and res judicata] as the original
opinion-supplemented by even more extended discussion of some of the
points-but, strangely, omitting the clearly correct assertion in the
original majority opinion that "Massey's conduct warranted the type of
judgment rendered Ibelow] in this case." This time the majority stands
silent regarding any disdain of Massey's conduct. Once again it bends
the law to deny Plaintiffs the proper "result that clearly appears to be
justified."
For the record, we wholeheartedly embrace the determination of this
Court in the original, now withdrawn, opinion that "Massey's conduct
warranted the type of judgment rendered [below] in this case."
Likewise, we do not shrink from saying without reservation that this
Court should now affirm the judgment against the Massey Defendants for
the reasons outlined in this dissent. Moreover, the failure of the Court
now to even acknowledge the justice of Plaintiffs' case below, as it had in
the previous opinion, underlines the result-driven nature of the current
majority opinion.
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layperson might label a "technicality" unrelated to the merits.
Observers, both legal and lay, could thus reasonably wonder whether
Massey's West Virginia victory was the product of showering so
much cash upon Justice Benjamin.
But, just as hard cases can make bad law, easy cases can
arguably do the same, a point stressed by the dissenters 140 and their
allies in the media and the public. 14 1 Even if one concedes that the
facts of Caperton are sufficiently outrageous to cry out for
intervention by the Court, one can credibly argue that the cure of the
Court's intervention could be worse overall than the disease of
perceived judicial bias. Put another way: just because Justice
Benjamin made a bad mistake does not necessarily mean that the
system as a whole is awash in such ethical lapses. Permitting the
Court to episodically intervene on due process grounds may thus, at
a minimum, be administrative overkill, leading to unwarranted
logistical burdens on the system (e.g., de rigour claims of failure to
recuse, weak certiorari petitions, increased cost and delay). Beyond
this, the "I know it when I see it" quality of the Caperton test for due
process recusal may encourage unwise substantive second-guessing
by the Court merely because the challenged decision reached a result
disfavored by five members of the court (or at least review if four
members of the Court held such concerns).
Although these criticisms of Caperton are justified, they are
also overwrought. Although the Roberts dissent lists some forty
questions largely attacking the practicality of the Caperton test
(eighty questions if one counts subparts), this exercise in Monday
Id. (internal citations omitted).
140. As the Roberts dissent stated:
[E]xtreme cases often test the bounds of established legal principles.
There is a cost to yielding to the desire to correct the extreme case, rather
than adhering to the legal principle. That cost has been demonstrated so
often that it is captured in a legal aphorism: "Hard cases make bad law."
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2272 (2009) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting).
141. See, e.g., Joshua Mayes, Elected Judges Under Fire: New Supreme
Court Case Expands Grounds for Judicial Recusal, MONDAQ, July 20, 2009
(discussing Caperton's expansion of bases for judicial recusal).
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morning quarterbacking largely submits to reasonable answers.142
While the Caperton approach cannot be reduced to a robotic
formula, most fair readers of the opinion understand what it means.
Henceforth, a state judge or justice should be reluctant to sit on any
case involving the litigant or a closely interested party where that
person or entity has been a major campaign supporter of the jurist in
question-or at least more reluctant than before Caperton.143
Consequently, much of the criticism of Caperton based on
practical application and consistency should be viewed as
insufficient to undermine the decision, and certainly insufficient to
suggest that it should have come out the other way. But it
nonetheless should be acknowledged that Caperton's standard for
invoking the Due Process Clause could be clearer. By adopting a
new test for due process disqualification, Caperton probably will
spur more disqualification litigation, some of it strategic rather than
valid. But the response to these fears should not be retreat from the
goal of judicial neutrality. More constructively, the Court can clarify
Caperton's application through a few well-chosen decisions
providing guidance on due process-based constitutionally required
recusal as well as consistently and quickly denying certiorari
petitions based on strained recusal arguments.
IV. MAKING CAPERTON BETTER THROUGH CLARITY AND
EXPANSION RATHER THAN RETRENCHMENT
A. The Value of Harmonizing Constitution-Based
Disqualification and Recusal Based on Rule or
Statute
Rather than being criticized as too great a federal
constitutional intervention in the state judiciary, observers should
142. See Stempel, Forty Questions, supra note , at text accompanying notes
75-215.
143. See Caperton Ruling May Spur States, supra note ; The Caperton v.
Massey case: Not for sale, supra note (stating that Caperton, whatever its
ambiguity, will make judges more reluctant to sit on cases affecting large
campaign contributors); see also Amanda Bronstad, Stage Set for Litigation Over
Judicial Recusal, NAT'L L.J., June 22, 2009, at 1 (same, but emphasizing
uncertainty of decision, tension with Court's First Amendment precedent, and
likelihood of additional litigation to test the limits of Caperton).
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recognize that Caperton's tentative and case-specific approach did
not go far enough and failed to enunciate the type of more sweeping
due process recusal standard necessary to restore and maintain
confidence in state judiciaries. The past twenty years have witnessed
a disturbing increase in expensive, highly electioneered state judicial
races in which under-informed voters in low-turnout contests are
subjected to misleading campaign advertisements largely financed
by interest groups. Money has begun to talk in a disturbing dialect in
state judicial elections. 144
What is needed is not a cautious or reluctant Caperton
doctrine but one that matches well with sound prevailing attitudes on
judicial recusal as expressed in the 2007 ABA Code of Judicial
Conduct. Due process-based recusal should not only be available
when there is an objective probability of bias in a judge, but should
be available whenever the judge's impartiality may be reasonably
questioned, in particular whenever the challenged judge has received
inordinate campaign support from a litigant, lawyer, or entity highly
interested in the outcome of a pending case.
The standards of Rule 2.11 of the Model Judicial Code and
federal disqualification law set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) should be
harmonized with the Constitution's mandate that state action (and
adjudication is, of course, state action) accord disputants due process
144. See The Caperton v. Massey case; Not for sale, supra note ("Between
2000 and 2007 state Supreme Court contests raised $168 [million], more than
twice the amount raised in the 1990s."); Terry Carter, Mud and Money: Judicial
Elections Turn to Big Bucks and Nasty Tactics, 91 A.B.A.J. 40, Feb. 2005, at 40
(noting national epidemic of expensive, shrill, and misleading judicial election
campaigns but spotlighting McGraw-Benjamin race); Brad McElhinny, State Bar
May Advise End to Judicial Elections, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, July 20, 2005,
at PlC (describing McGraw-Benjamin race as "the most expensive and possibly
the nastiest in state history."); Paul J. Nyden, Court Race Nation's Most Negative:
Two-fifths of TV Attack Ads in Battles for Bench Aired in W. Va., Study Says,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, June 28, 2005, at IC (reporting study by NYU Law
School Brennan Center for Justice and Institute for Money in Politics finding
forty-three percent of all attack ads in judicial races in America in 2004 were aired
in West Virginia); Kavan Peterson, Costs of judicial races stirs reformers,
STATELINE.ORG, Aug. 5, 2005, http://www.stateline.org/live/
ViewPage.action?siteNodeld=136&languageldl&contentld=47067 (noting that
West Virginia "is considering scrapping judicial elections altogether after state
voters were bombarded by more than 4,000 TV attack ads in 2004 during the most
expensive high court race in state history," and that the executive director of West
Virginia state bar had stated that "[n]o one in West Virginia was pleased with the
kind of campaigning we saw in last year's Supreme Court race").
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of the law. The solution to the Caperton dissenters' operational
concerns lies in recognizing that all recusal errors violate due process
and that all such mistakes by the state bench are at least potentially
subject to reversal by the U.S. Supreme Court on due process
grounds.
At first glance, this proposition may seem excessive. The
Caperton majority took pains to state that it regarded the Due
Process Clause as having less expansive reach than federal and state
law regarding judicial disqualification. 145  As outlined by the
majority, Congress and the states are free to require recusal even
where failure to require disqualification would not rise to the level of
a due process violation. 146 To illustrate, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and Rule
2.11 of the Model Judicial Code both require a judge to step aside if
his or her impartiality "might be reasonably questioned."
147
However, under Caperton, a judge's failure to properly apply this
standard does not rise to the level of a due process violation unless
there is not only a reasonable question as to the judge's impartiality
but also a probability or unacceptable risk that the non-recusing
judge is also in fact biased or prejudiced.
The Caperton standard is thus too skittish about interfering in
state judicial miscarriages of justice because it fails to acknowledge
an essential truth: when a party's claim is heard by a judge who
improperly failed to recuse, that party has been denied due process
even if the erring judge's participation does not create the probability
of actual bias. It is enough that the erring judge's impartiality was
subject to reasonable question and yet the judge continued to
participate in the case. Now that the "no reasonable question
regarding impartiality" standard has governed disqualification for
more than thirty-five years, the Caperton majority is incorrect to
suggest that failure to meet this standard could somehow satisfy due
process. To talk of a lower bar set by the Constitution as compared
to essentially uniform national law (via state adoption of the Model
145. See supra Part III.A.
146. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009)
(noting that states may choose to adopt disqualification standards "more rigorous
than due process requires" (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S.
765, 794 (2002) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)) and that the Due Process Clause
"demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial disqualification" (quoting Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986))).
147. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2008); ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
R. 2.11 (2007).
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Judicial Code) seems inapt and incorrect when the question is about
judicial neutrality rather than amount of public benefits or length of a
limitations period.
The U.S. Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence,
although nuanced and reasonably complex, essentially devolves to
the position that in order to satisfy due process, a litigant's claim or
defense must be adjudicated by a neutral decision maker following
uniform procedure even-handedly applied to the litigants. 148 The
modem concept of a neutral decision maker is one whose
impartiality is not subject to reasonable question. Where the judge's
impartiality is subject to reasonable question, Section 455(a) and
Rule 2.11 have been violated. When this occurs, the proceeding is
by definition one lacking a neutral decision maker and the litigant
has been denied a basic pillar of due process.
In any case involving a judge lacking neutrality as defined by
the modem norm, due process is absent. Although the precise
contours between procedural due process and substantive due
process are often blurred, it seems inarguable that adjudication by a
judge that erred in failing to disqualify violates procedural due
process in that the aggrieved litigant did not receive the type of
neutral tribunal guaranteed by the Constitution. A logical extension
of this assessment therefore recognizes that there is a due process
violation every time a disqualified judge nonetheless presides in a
case.
B. Fear Not the Floodgates
Whether the Supreme Court wishes to intervene in every
such case is yet another question. As a practical matter, there will
always be strong de facto limits on Caperton-style review of judicial
148. See BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK & TONI M. MASSARO, CIVIL
PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS 48-53 (2d ed. 2001) (exploring implication of
having a neutral and passive decision maker); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note, at
chs. 10-11 (discussing constitutional issues regarding individual liberties and
substantive due process); see, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970)
("[A]n impartial decision maker is essential."); Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 325 n.4 (1976) (citing Goldberg's discussion of an impartial decision maker);
see also STEPHEN N. SUBRIN, MARTHA L. MINOw, MARK S. BRODIN & THOMAS 0.
MAIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND CONTEXT 21-58 (2d ed.
2004) (reproducing and summarizing cases with illustrative commentary taking
similar view regarding necessity of neutral decision maker to satisfy due process).
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recusal decisions. The Court decides fewer than 100 cases a year149
and has nearly complete control over its docket. 5 ' Only if four
justices find non-recusal sufficiently outrageous will the Court grant
certiorari and review the matter. 51 As the Caperton dissents reveal,
four current justices would prefer that the Court never review such
cases. Realistically, the Court will in the foreseeable future review
only very suspicious, seemingly outrageous failures to recuse. Fairly
debatable decisions declining disqualification are effectively immune
from U.S. Supreme Court review.
Although this may disappoint those who see the system as
too lax regarding recusal, it is almost a complete refutation of the
dissenters' lament that Caperton will usher in a flood of certiorari
petitions alleging failure to recuse sufficient to violate due process.
Although there will indeed probably be an uptick in the number of
such certiorari arguments, this creates at most a somewhat greater
logistical burden on the Court, which is a small price to pay for
making the Court and the Constitution available to police judicial
impartiality in important or outrageous cases. Further, because the
Court already has moved away from individual-Justice assessment of
certiorari petitions through use of a "cert pool" in which all Justices
but Justice Stevens participate,' 52 the additional screening work per
Justice or per chamber would seem minimal.
Consequently, moving from a "probability of bias or
prejudice" or "unacceptable risk of bias" test for due process
149. See Supreme Court of the United States, Opinions, http://www.
supremecourtus.gov/opinions/opinions.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2009) (providing,
among other things, links to 2006-2009 opinions of the court, which when
followed list 83 decisions in the OT 08 Term, 74 in the OT 07 Term, and 75 in the
OT 06 Term).
150. See STERN ET AL., supra note 116, at 220-21; LexisNexis.com,
Landmark Supreme Court Cases, http://wiki.lexisnexis.com/academic/
index.php?title=Landmark Supreme_CourtCases (last visited Oct. 18, 2009)
(stating that the court has discretionary review over all but a small number of cases
where it has original jurisdiction).
151. See Jonathan Remy Nash, The Majority that Wasn't: Stare Decisis,
Majority Rule, and the Mischief of Quorum Requirements, 58 EMORY L.J. 831,
846-47 (2009) ("[A]t least four Justices must concur before the Court may hear
most cases.").
152. David R. Stras, The Supreme Court's Gatekeepers: The Role of Law
Clerks in the Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 953 (2007); Paul D.
Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess: Reviving the
Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 587, 630-31 (2009).
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disqualification to a test asking whether the court erroneously
applied applicable federal or state disqualification law is unlikely to
unleash any greater number of recusal-based requests for certiorari
because the Caperton test is not all that different from the "erroneous
failure to recuse" test I advocate. To the extent there is no great
difference in court workload under either standard, adoption of this
article's suggested broader test can bring the benefits of consistency
(the general recusal standard and the due process recusal standard
would be the same) and greater predictability (there are many
general recusal cases by which litigation outcomes can be predicted
but comparatively few due process disqualification cases, making
predictability problematic under that standard). Most important,
however, shifting from the Caperton probability of bias standard to
the error-in-recusal standard would signal greater systemic
commitment to judicial neutrality. Even if, as a practical matter,
only the most egregious failures to recuse will be heard by the high
court, the possibility sets a standard requiring greater care throughout
the judicial system.
If the legal system wants to give more than lip service to the
idea of judicial neutrality, it should acknowledge that every
erroneous recusal decision denies due process. A due process
violation occurs when the judge presides over a case under
circumstances where his or her impartiality is subject to reasonable
question. The additional Caperton requirement of the "probability"
of actual bias is unnecessary.
C. Procedural and Substantive Due Process Regarding
Disqualification
Adjudication involving a judge who should have been
disqualified from presiding violates both procedural and substantive
due process. At a minimum, a disputant appearing before a
disqualified judge has not had fair procedural process. These
circumstances also violate substantive due process in that a litigant
not only has the procedural right to a neutral forum but also that
judicial neutrality is itself a substantive right of which litigants
should not be divested.
I realize this is perhaps a radical assertion, one that if
accepted poses some danger of expansive substantive due process
review that might actually lead to some of the negative implications
Winter 20 10]
HeinOnline -- 29 Rev. Litig. 301 2009-2010
THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION
outlined in the Roberts and Scalia dissents to the Caperton
holding. 153  However, unless the Court is willing to repudiate its
punitive damages precedents, my logic seems unassailable. The
Court has now repeatedly stated that substantive due process permits
the Court to overturn punitive damage awards that are the product of
full and procedurally fair adjudication under applicable state law.' 54
The Court has not been this blunt about the substantive due process
basis for its punitive damages policing, 155 and one can argue that the
punitive damages awards suffered from procedural irregularities are
sufficient to justify the Court's intervention. 156 Fairly read, however,
153. See supra Part III.B.
154. See supra note and accompanying text.
155. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S 408, 416
(2003) (majority only mentioning that there are "procedural and substantive
constitutional limitations" on punitive damages awards states can give); BMW of
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 598-99 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I do
not regard the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause as a secret repository
of substantive guarantees against 'unfaimess'-neither the unfairness of an
excessive civil compensatory award, nor the unfairness of an 'unreasonable'
punitive award. What the Fourteenth Amendment's procedural guarantee assures
is an opportunity to contest the reasonableness of a damages judgment in state
court. .. ").
156. For example, in the 2003 Campbell decision, discussed in notes and,
supra, the Court vacated the $145 million punitive award against the insurer in part
because the state courts had permitted plaintiffs to introduce evidence of
defendant's wrongdoing in other states involving other types of insurance policies.
See 538 U.S. at 422 ("A defendant's dissimilar acts, independent from the acts
upon which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive
damages."). This troubling assessment restricting the scope of judicial inquiry into
defendant wrongdoing is arguably a procedural due process analysis and arguably
could have been enough to support the Court's eradication of the punitive award.
However, the Campbell opinion centers on setting forth a substantive template for
due process review of punitive damages awards, most infamously the Court's
admonishment that punitive assessments exceeding nine times the compensatory
award were usually constitutionally infirm. See id. at 425 ("[F]ew awards
exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a
significant degree, will satisfy due process."); see also STEMPEL, supra note , at ch.
22 (summarizing and criticizing Court's analysis of procedural and substantive
issues). As a whole, Campbell thus seems clearly to be a substantive due process
opinion.
Other Supreme Court opinions striking down punitive damages on due
process grounds also often have some procedural aspect as well. For example, the
2007 Philip Morris v. Williams decision directed substantial focus to the jury
instructions used in the case. 549 U.S. 346, 352, 357 (2007); see also supra note.
But Williams also contained substantial discussion of substantive due process
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the Court's punitive damage due process cases appear to stand for
the proposition that a state court litigation outcome violates due
process if the end result is sufficiently unfair. This is a substantive
due process argument (and pretty clear judicial activism), no matter
how reluctant the Justices may be to admit it.
Procedural due process is fairness in the process by which a
case is adjudicated. 157 If a statute or rule is under procedural due
process review, the question is whether the law does not provide
adequately fair process to a litigant.158  Substantive due process
means that the case outcome or legal regime affecting a litigant was
substantively unfair, as the name implies. 
159
limitations on the size of punitive damages awards. Id. at 361 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he Court should be 'reluctant to expand the concept of substantive
due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered
area are scarce and open-ended."' (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S.
115, 125 (1992))). In addition, BMW, the case that started the Court down the road
of punitive damages review, appears not to have been based on any procedural
deficiencies below but only on the Court's perceived unfairness of awarding a
doctor $4 million because the paint on his BMW had been retouched. See BMW,
517 U.S. at 575-76 (stating that "elementary notions of fairness" indicate that the
punitive damages award was "grossly excessive"); see also supra note.
157. See JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
197-99 (6th ed. 2003) (outlining the tests for whether a violation of procedural due
process has occurred, and defining key terms); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note,
§ 10.6(a) (comparing procedural due process and substantive review); Mark T.
Fennell, Note, Preserving Process in the Wake of Policy: The Need for Appointed
Counsel in Immigration Removal Proceedings, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHiCS &
PUB. POL'Y 261, 269 (2009) (discussing the need for procedural reform in
immigration representation because of currently unfair procedures).
158. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note, § 10.6(a); see Kelly v. Wyman, 294
F. Supp. 893, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ("[W]e hold that due process requires an
adequate hearing before termination of welfare benefits, and the fact that there is a
later constitutionally fair proceeding does not alter the result."); Kimberly N.
Brown, Justiciable Generalized Grievances, 68 MD. L. REv. 221, 258-59 (2008)
(noting that a procedural due process violation can create an Article III case or
controversy even without a showing of separate concrete harm to the plaintiff);
Michelle M. Mello et al., Policy Experimentation with Administrative
Compensation for Medical Injury: Issues Under State Constitutional Law, 45
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 59, 73 (2008) (comparing the tests for procedural due process
and equal protection).
159. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note , § 10.6(a); see Rosalie Berger
Levinson, Reining in Abuses of Executive Power Through Substantive Due
Process, 60 FLA. L. REv. 519, 519 (2008) (defining substantive due process and
discussing how federal courts can use substantive due process review as a layer of
appeal over state courts).
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Advocates of limited federal constitutional intrusion into
state matters may resist any sort of procedural due process review
but are generally more concerned about case-specific review, as this
puts the Supreme Court in the position of acting as another layer of
appeal over state courts, while due process review of the face of a
statute is a more Aeneralized, arguably less intrusive, form of due
process scrutiny. 1  Generally, advocates of constitutional restraint
are more troubled by the use of substantive due process than of
procedural due process.' 61 The latter inquiry is less intrusive in that
it only insists that states operate a procedurally fair system, without
becoming involved in the outcomes that emerge from that
procedurally fair system. By contrast, a substantive due process
inquiry asks not only whether a litigant received a fair process but
also evaluates the case result and sets it aside if it is deemed
sufficiently substantively unfair.
Substantive due process review of state law received a
particularly bad name because of its use in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century to strike down progressive social legislation
on the ground that this violated the substantive constitutional rights
of the regulated, including the "right" of workers to toil for endless
hours under unsafe conditions for low pay. 162 The apogee of this use
of substantive due process is generally seen as Lochner v. New York,
a case in which the Court used substantive due process to strike
down a labor law modestly protective of workers.' 63 Within a few
160. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note, § 10.6.
161. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note , §10.6; see ROBERT M. COVER,
OWEN M. Fiss & JUDITH RESNIK, PROCEDURE 101 643 (1988) (noting that
substantive due process has a "somewhat negative connotation"); William Ray
Huhn, In Defense of the Roosevelt Court, 2 FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 1, 25 n.136
(2007) (calling substantive due process "an oxymoron of the law"); Herbert L.
Packer, The Aims of the Criminal Law Revisited: A Plea for a New Look at
"Substantive Due Process," 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 490, 490 (1971) ("That 'substantive
due process' is a dirty phrase is well recognized by lawyers and law students.").
162. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (holding
unconstitutional a state law prohibiting railroad employees from becoming union
members); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 166, 180 (1908) (holding
unconstitutional a similar federal law); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 62-64
(1905) (holding that the state abused its police power when it enacted a law
limiting the number of hours a bakery employee could work per week because
such a regulation violated due process rights by depriving citizens of their liberty
to contract with employers for their livelihood).
163. 198 U.S. at 62-64.
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years, the Court was moving away from this perspective, arguably
rejecting it altogether by the New Deal era.1 64 However, more recent
case law is often characterized as sounding uncomfortable with
notions of substantive due process. For example, Roe v. Wade,
which struck down state abortion regulation,' 65 is often characterized
as a problematic substantive due process decision of the left akin to
Lochner's use of substantive due process by the right.' 66 Other
decisions upholding individual rights against state regulation, such as
Griswold v. Connecticut, suggest that substantive due process did not
disappear when Lochner fell from favor.1
67
Despite controversy over its use and a certain whose-ox-is-
getting-gored quality to the debate over its use, judicial review on
substantive due process grounds remains part of the constitutional
fabric. But it is almost uniformly regarded as more problematic than
judicial review based only on procedural due process grounds. 168
164. See David N. Mayer, The Myth of "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism":
Liberty of Contract During the Lochner Era, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 217, 226
(2009) (stating that the New Deal "transformed substantive due process"); Stephen
O'Hanlon, Justice Kennedy's Short-Lived Libertarian Revolution: A Brief History
of Supreme Court Libertarian Ideology, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 1,
22 (2008) (noting that the New Deal era ended the precedent of using substantive
due process to guarantee freedom of contract); David A. Strauss, The Modernizing
Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 859, 859 (2009) (noting difference
between the last 40 years of substantive due process decisions and pre-New Deal
decisions).
165. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973).
166. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 212 n.57 (1980) [hereinafter ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST]
(criticizing Roe on these grounds); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 944-45 (1973) (using the term
"Lochnering" to describe the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade as "ramming its
personal preferences down the country's throat"); V.F. Nourse & Sarah A.
Maguire, The Lost History of Governance and Equal Protection, 58 DUKE L.J.
955, 974 (2009) (referring to the Lochner and Roe v. Wade decisions as twins).
167. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (striking down
Connecticut law banning use of contraceptives, even by married persons); BARRON
& DIENES, supra note , at 195-234 (providing additional examples of use of
substantive due process reasoning in support of individual rights in conflict with
government regulation).
168. See ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note, at 18 (referring to
substantive due process as a "contradiction in terms"); John F. Basiak, Jr., The
Roberts Court and the Future of Substantive Due Process: The Demise of "Split-
the-Difference" Jurisprudence?, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 861, 902 (2007) (arguing
against substantive due process as judicial overreaching and lacking historical
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The prevailing sentiment in the legal community is that judicial
intervention to ensure fair procedure is necessary for a functional
legal system but that, beyond this, the U.S. Supreme Court should be
reluctant to second-guess the substantive outcomes that emerge from
a procedurally adequate state legal system.'
69
The aversion to constitutional supervision of particular state
court outcomes is part of the Roberts dissent1 70 in Caperton and
forms the focus of the Scalia dissent.' 71  The vehemence of the
Scalia dissent in particular suggests that he saw the Caperton
majority as engaging in substantive due process review. One
reasonable response to this concern is a judicial preference for
making procedural due process the primary focus of review of
disqualification decisions, using substantive due process only in
extreme cases (such as Caperton). Better yet, as described below,
Caperton could have been decided solely on procedural due process
grounds in that the challenged jurist had unfettered, absolute, and
final authority to evaluate his own impartiality,172 a judge-as-king
system that violates procedural due process.
1. Primarily a Problem of Procedure
Characterizing the right to a neutral magistrate as primarily
one of procedural due process provides a means of placing de jure
limits on Caperton-style review by the U.S. Supreme Court. If the
right to a neutral judge is one of procedural due process, the
constitutional requirement would seem to be satisfied whenever the
disqualification decision in question is subject to sufficiently
foundation); Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L.
REv. 105, 121 (2005) (stating that the Supreme Court's use of substantive due
process to overrule punitive damages awards "appears to be textually untethered").
169. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note, § 10.6 (providing an
overview of procedural and substantive due process review); Peter J. Rubin,
Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due
Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 833-34 (2003) (noting
that even the Supreme Court does not seem completely comfortable with the
notion of substantive due process); Zipursky, supra note , at 120 (discussing
Justice Scalia's constitutional theory and his reproach of substantive due process
cases).
170. See supra text accompanying notes - (summarizing Roberts dissent).
171. See supra text accompanying notes - (summarizing Scalia dissent).
172. See supra Parts IJ.B & II.C (discussing case history and Justice
Benjamin's sole authority over the issue of his participation in the case).
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disinterested review. To the extent states provide this, they would
effectively insulate their disqualification decisions from review on
procedural due process grounds.
Consider, for example, the typical disqualification case in
which a litigant challenges a trial judge's impartiality. Although the
trial judge himself makes the initial decision as to whether he will
sit, that decision is subject to review through appeal, usually to both
an intermediate appellate court and the state supreme court.
17 3
Although appellate review of the trial judge's decision normally
must await final resolution of the case at the trial court level, an
aggrieved litigant may also make an interlocutory challenge to the
non-recusing judge through a writ of mandamus or prohibition. 174
Increasingly, states also provide that the trial judge's decision
refusing recusal will be examined by the chief judge of the district or
by another disinterested judge in the district.' 75 Thus, trial court
recusal decisions, although heavily influenced by the target judge's
own views as to his or her impartiality, are not in the final instance
decided by the judge whose neutrality is at issue. It would thus seem
that the litigant always receives procedural due process in such
cases, even if the reviewing tribunal perpetuates a target judge's
error in failing to order recusal. However, if the right to a neutral
adjudicator is one of substantive due process, one can argue that
even after layers of review, it is possible that the participation of a
tainted judge violates the Due Process Clause.
173. See FLAMM, supra note , at 823-906 (providing state-by-state summary
of disqualification for cause); Stempel, supra note , at 645-46 (discussing
disqualification procedure as applied to trial judges and finding it acceptable).
174. See FLAMM, supra note , at 823-906 (providing review of state
substantive recusal law); Id. at 959-82 (discussing appellate remedies, including
extraordinary writs such as mandamus); ROGER S. HAYDOCK, DAVID F. HERR &
JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRETRIAL LITIGATION § 11.5.2 (7th ed.
2008) (discussing motions for the disqualification of a judge); Stempel, supra note
I at 634 ("Ordinarily... the unsuccessful recusal movant must wait until the
conclusion of trial court proceedings and use the judge's recusal decision as a
point for appeal from a loss on the merits .... [But] recusal denial can become a
proper interlocutory appeal in three ways .... ").
175. See Deborah Goldberg, James Sample & David E. Pozen, The Best
Defense: Why Elected Courts Should Lead Recusal Reform, 46 WASHBURN L.J.
503, 516-25 (2007) (stating that elected courts need to restore public trust by
enacting recusal reform). This is, for example, the procedure in Nevada courts.
See note 205, infra.
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At the intermediate appellate level, a similar situation occurs.
In most states, it appears that a challenge to an appellate judge's
impartiality is first decided by the challenged judge and the decision
is then reviewed by at least another judge or panel of the court if not
the full court. 17 6 Beyond this, any state supreme court review of the
case will necessarily include review of the disqualification
determination if it reviews the case at all. 177 Because the challenged
appellate judge does not have the final say concerning participation
in the case, it would appear that procedural due process has been
satisfied, even in cases where the challenged judge and the initially
reviewing court have erred.
At the state supreme court level, recusal practice is more
problematic. Many courts, perhaps a majority, appear to follow the
U.S. Supreme Court's defective model of allowing the challenged
judge to be the first and last word on impartiality.178 Motions to
recuse in such states are, as with the U.S. Supreme Court, addressed
to the individual challenged justice, with no right to demand review
before the entire court or even another justice or panel of the court.
176. See FLAMM, supra note , at 823-906 (outlining individual state
requirements for judicial disqualification); Goldberg et al., supra note , at 516-25
("Some courts require the challenged judge to transfer these motions immediately
to a colleague ....").
177. See, e.g., In re Anderson, 814 P.2d 773, 776 (Ariz. 1991) (finding that
judge should not preside over cases involving a hospital because judge sat on
hospital's board); Gillum v. United States, 613 A.2d 366, 369-70 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(per curiam) (requiring recusal of judge after a "heated" exchange between the
judge and counsel during the trial); In re Blake, 912 So. 2d 907, 917-18 (Miss.
2005) (holding that a trial judge was so obviously biased against an attorney that
she must disqualify herself from all seven cases on her docket involving the
attorney); Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 393 A.2d 386, 394 (Pa. 1978) (finding
that where record reveals ongoing bitter controversy between judge and defendant,
recusal was required in summary contempt proceedings).
178. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS
L.J. 657, 692 n.172 (2005) ("The problem is that, whether a justice is right or
wrong, ultimately he or she is right by definition. Once a justice decides that he or
she is fit to hear a case, there is no process for challenging that conclusion and it
becomes the law .. "); Stempel, supra note , at 868-73 (explaining that though
the "duty to sit" doctrine, which pushes judges to "resolve close disqualification
issues against recusal," was eliminated in 1974, "a surprising number of relatively
recent federal cases ... treat the duty to sit as a continuingly viable concept.");
Stempel, supra note , at 642 ("[E]ach Justice is an island, an autonomous final
decisionmaker on questions of his or her own fitness to decide a matter
impartially.").
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In these situations, it would seem that the litigant moving for
disqualification is always denied procedural due process due to error
in recusal because the final determination is not made by a neutral
magistrate, panel, or entity.
The problem is well-illustrated in Caperton v. Massey itself.
As the Massey challenge to Caperton's $50 million lower court
award made its way to the state supreme court, Caperton made at
least three requests for recusal to Justice Benjamin. 179 All were
denied-by Justice Benjamin himself-who also wrote at length to
defend his non-recusal, 180 a response that tended to give credence to
the challenge as Justice Benjamin "protested too much" and seemed
excessively eager to continue to participate in an important case
affecting his largest campaign benefactor.
Given the history of the Caperton litigation and the judicial
politics of West Virginia, one can never be sure, but it seems a safe
bet that Justice Benjamin would have been off the case had the full
state supreme court (minus Justice Benjamin, of course) been
permitted to rule on the question of the Benjamin disqualification.
Even if the four other members of the West Virginia court had erred
and denied the recusal motion, one can make a strong case that
Caperton would have then at least received adequate procedural due
process. His motion to recuse would have been evaluated by a group
of four "neutral" state supreme court justices. Moral of the story:
state supreme courts can largely eliminate the threat of Caperton-
style U.S. Supreme Court interference in state court proceedings by
simply providing a reasonably fair mechanism for deciding recusal
motions, one in which the target justice is excluded from being a
judge in his own disqualification case.
2. The Practical Problems of a Purely Procedural
Approach
Although it is clearly better to have the full state supreme
court decide a recusal question than to leave it exclusively in the
hands of the challenged justice, one can make a convincing argument
that the full court is not a completely disinterested body unaffected
by bias or prejudice. One powerful influence on any state supreme
179. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2258 (2009).
180. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223 (W. Va. 2008),
rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
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court is collegiality. The justices are disinclined even to appear to
question one another's judicial propriety.'81 Consequently, where a
challenged justice is slow to grant credence to a recusal motion or
opposes it altogether, this puts the other state justices in a most
uncomfortable position. Should they disagree with the challenged
justice, they are in the position of at least being perceived as having
besmirched the integrity of a colleague. In any small organization
working in close quarters, members will be disinclined to create
these sorts of inter-court frictions.' 82 As a result, full court review of
a single justice's refusal to recuse may be a relatively weak check on
the challenged justice's self-interest and self-perception.
One disturbing (to me, at least) example of such collegiality
is the U.S. Supreme Court's implicit attitude to a high profile
disqualification error made by then-Justice William Rehnquist.
Justice Rehnquist refused to recuse himself in Laird v. Tatum, an
action challenging Defense Department surveillance of civilians
suspected of opposing the Vietnam War. 183 Prior to joining the
Court, Justice Rehnquist had, as head of the Justice Department's
Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") in the Nixon Administration, been
involved in assessing and approving the surveillance program's
legality and had supported the program, both as OLC head and in
testimony at his confirmation hearings.'1 84 Nonetheless, he refused to
remove himself from the case when it reached the Supreme Court,
casting a deciding vote that effectively ended the legal challenge to
the surveillance program.185
181. See Jeremy M. Miller, Judicial Recusal and Disqualification: The Need
for a Per Se Rule on Friendship (Not Acquaintance), 33 PEPP. L. REv. 575, 592
n.122 (2006) (arguing that putting recusal decisions to a vote among court
members might "destroy the necessary collegiality of [the] small group"); R.
Matthew Pearson, Duck Duck Recuse? Foreign Common Law Guidance &
Improving Recusal of Supreme Court Justices, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1799,
1835 (2005) ("En banc determination also risks inserting artificial animosity into a
collegial and respectful environment by asking Justices to rule on the propriety of
a colleague's conduct.").
182. See supra note.
183. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (decision on the merits
dismissing claim on justiciability grounds); Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972)
(mem.) (Justice Rehnquist explaining and defending his decision not to recuse in
case).
184. Stempel, supra note , at 851-52.
185. Id.; Stempel, supra note, at 589-604.
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In the aftermath of the case and criticism of his role, Justice
Rehnquist drafted a memorandum attempting to defend his decision
and sought comment from Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices
Byron White and Potter Stewart. 186 Although they varied in their
advice about the wisdom of revisiting the issue in a written
memorandum, all appeared to support Justice Rehnquist's decision
to sit on the case. 187  After publication of the Rehnquist
memorandum, Justice Powell sent a note of congratulatory
approval. 188
Unfortunately, however, Justice Rehnquist's participation in
Laird v. Tatum was erroneous and indefensible, and his explanatory
memorandum was misleading and unpersuasive. 189 Nonetheless, it
186. Stempel, supra note, at 858 n.126.
187. See id. at 813 (describing hand-written note from Justice Potter Stewart
to "Bill" stating that he agreed with [Justice] "Byron" [White] that "publication of
the [Rehnquist] memo [explaining and defending his decision not to recuse] would
be basically healthy-it is informative, thoughtful, persuasive, and educational"
although it will not "satisfy the N. Y Times, Washington Post, or other critics" of
Rehnquist's decision to participate in Laird v. Tatum). With all due respect to the
well-regarded Justice Stewart, his assessment of the Rehnquist memorandum is
clearly incorrect. The vast bulk of scholarly opinion has concluded that the
Rehnquist participation in Laird v. Tatum was completely unjustified, primarily
because of his involvement in the very conduct under review. See Stempel, supra
note , at 851-63 (collecting assessments, including those of noted judicial ethics
experts Stephen Gillers and Geoffrey Hazard); Stempel, supra note , at 589-632
(same plus finding additional flaws in Rehnquist memorandum). That Justice
Stewart, even in a personal note, was not more willing to take issue with Justice
Rehnquist's mistakes illustrates the difficulty of an isolated court reviewing the
disqualification decisions of colleagues.
Worse, the Court continues to cite the Rehnquist memorandum in seeming
obliviousness to its flaws and tainted history. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn.
v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 777-78 (2002) (favorable citation to Rehnquist
memorandum in majority opinion). In fairness to the Court and Justice Scalia,
author of the White opinion, I note that the portion of the Rehnquist memorandum
cited focused on a judge's general judicial philosophy, correctly concluding that it
ordinarily was not a basis for disqualification. Not every word of the Rehnquist
memorandum is wrong. But it remains to me odd and disturbing that the Court
would continue to look for guidance in the largely disgraced work product of a
single Justice making a very incorrect decision regarding recusal.
188. See Stempel, supra note , at 858 n.126 (describing hand-written note
from Justice Lewis Powell that stated "your splendid memorandum on
'disqualification' constitutes a conclusive answer to the motion.").
189. See id. at 851-63 (discussing Justice Rehnquist's decision not to recuse
in detail); Stempel, supra note , at 589-604 (first discussing and then criticizing
that decision in detail).
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received the de facto support of four justices, suggesting that even a
very bad decision not to disqualify could have been rubber stamped
had the Rehnquist recusal been reviewed by the full court.
Even in the Caperton opinion itself, one can see the impact of
judicial collegiality. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, despite its
disapproval of what happened below, takes pains to dispel any
notion that it is accusing Justice Benjamin of wrongdoing.' 90  In
particular, the majority tries to make clear that it does not see Justice
Benjamin as having taken a bribe or having become embroiled in a
quid-pro-quo arrangement with benefactor Blankenship. 191 Readers
might conclude that this is merely good manners on Justice
Kennedy's part and an aversion to kicking Justice Benjamin when he
is down. But the Caperton majority opinion nonetheless suggests
that jurists are very slow to make negative conclusions about one
another. The dissenters, of course, essentially thought Justice
Benjamin did nothing wrong, 192 another illustration of the practical
reluctance judges have toward finding error or wrongdoing in
another judge's disqualification. 193
190. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263-64
(2009) ("Justice Benjamin was careful to address the recusal motions and explain
his reasons why, on his view of the controlling standard, disqualification was not
in order. In four separate opinions issued during the course of the appeal, he
explained why no actual bias had been established. . . . [B]ased on the facts
presented by Caperton, Justice Benjamin conducted a probing search into his
actual motives and inclinations; and he found none to be improper. We do not
question his subjective findings of impartiality and propriety. Nor do we
determine whether there was actual bias."); see also id. at 2265 ("Justice Benjamin
did undertake an extensive search for actual bias.").
191. See id. at 2262 ("Though not a bribe or criminal influence, Justice
Benjamin would nevertheless feel a debt of gratitude to Blankenship for his
extraordinary efforts to get him elected.").
192. See supra Part III.B.
193. The same problem was manifested in Liljeberg v. Health Services
Acquisition Corp., in which the Court narrowly (5-4) found disqualification
required pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 of a judge whose behavior as jurist and
trustee of a university with a land deal at stake in litigation was eyebrow-raising to
many, although not to the dissenting justices. 486 U.S. 847 (1988). Several years
later, the trial judge in question was convicted of "bribery, conspiracy, and
obstruction of justice in connection with his judicial duties" and sentenced to
almost seven years imprisonment. STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS
602 (8th ed. 2009). Liljeberg, like Caperton, suggests that the Court is slow to
think anything but the best about a judge under challenge.
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The majority acknowledges, as would any reasonable
observer, that $3 million is a lot of money.' 94 But rather than
blaming Benjamin for failing to see how receipt of such large sums
made his participation in Caperton problematic, the Caperton
majority blames Blankenship for injecting the specter of influence
peddling into judicial elections.' 95 "It takes two to tango" is a cliche,
but one with some bite in this situation. Although Justice Benjamin
could not prevent Blankenship individually or Blankenship-funded
special interest groups from supporting the Benjamin candidacy,
Justice Benjamin could have easily refused to assist Blankenship in
overturning a $50 million liability.
Justice Benjamin deserves more than a little scorn. Instead,
even the majority that found his participation to violate due process
treated him with kid gloves. Worse yet, four members of the Court
(Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito) defended Justice
Benjamin's grotesquely bad error in judgment. Although the U.S.
Supreme Court's practice of giving each justice unfettered control
over his or her participation in a case is close to disgraceful, the
brutal, sad truth is that full Court review over the Court's own
recusal matters might not change things much. If the Justices are
this reluctant to criticize a state court judge they have never met,
how likely are they to effectively police one another?
Likewise, although full state supreme court review of
disqualification motions affecting individual justices would be an
improvement over West Virginia's system, it should not be viewed
as a panacea. Once again, evidence of the limits of this approach is
right under our figurative noses. In Caperton itself, the West
Virginia high court divided 3-2, with Justice Benjamin in the
majority and the dissenters criticizing his decision to participate.' 96
Consequently, the seemingly likely result of full state supreme court
review in Caperton itself would have been a 2-2 deadlock
concerning Justice Benjamin's participation, a result that would
194. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257 ("To provide some perspective,
Blankenship's $3 million in contributions were more than the total amount spent
by all other Benjamin supporters and three times the amount spent by Benjamin's
own committee.").
195. Id. at 2256-59 (directing most implicit criticism for problematic nature
of case and 2004 West Virginia Supreme Court election at Blankenship as
contributor and activist rather than at Justice Benjamin for failing to recuse).
196. Id. at 2258-59.
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leave Justice Benjamin on the case notwithstanding the extreme facts
supporting disqualification.
Moreover, in some cases, full state supreme court review of
disqualification may produce the other extreme. Some members of
the full court could have substantially different judicial views than
the challenged justice and may wish to use the recusal motion as an
opportunity to remove the challenged justice from the case for
strategic reasons. Although the default cultural norm in courts and
similar small organizations (e.g., law firms, faculties, legislatures, or
city councils) is one of getting along and going along, the dynamic
may occasionally shift to one of intense partisanship or personal
dislike that creates the opposite effect. Instead of bending over
backwards not to imply any ethical lapse in a colleague, some
justices may grope to find reasons to support even a weak recusal
motion.
For example, the Texas Supreme Court decisions of the
1990s produced a number of decisions reflecting sharp ideological
splits. 197 Although a solid conservative working majority dominated
court decisions of the decade, there was a vocal minority of liberals
usually in dissent. The apparent leaders of the warring factions were
Republican John Comyn, a former state attorney general and current
U.S. Senator generally regarded as one of the body's most
conservative members,198 and Democrat Lloyd Doggett, currently a
U.S. Representative as liberal as Comyn is conservative. 199 Their
197. See cases cited infra note.
198. Senator Cornyn attended St. Mary's School of Law in San Antonio,
Texas, and received a Masters of Law from the University of Virginia Law School.
United States Senator John Comyn, Biography, http://comyn.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?FuseAction=AboutSenatorComyn.Biography (last visited Oct. 18,
2009). He served as a Texas District Court Judge as well as state attorney general
and Texas Supreme Court Justice. Id. As a political figure, Comyn has been a
supporter of the OPEN Government Act, a reform of the Freedom of Information
Act. Id. In his second year in the Senate, he served on the Deputy Whip team. Id.
In the Senate, Comyn has served as the Vice Chairman of the Senate Republican
Conference as well as the Chairman of the National Republican Senatorial
Committee. Id. Comyn now serves on the Budget, Senate Finance, and Judiciary
Committees. Id. The National Journal recently ranked Cornyn as the 17th most
conservative member of the Senate. Senate Ratings, NAT'L J. MAG., Feb. 28,
2009, available at http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/
cs_20090228 4726.php.
199. Congressman Doggett graduated from the University of Texas School
of Law. Congressman Lloyd Doggett, About Lloyd Doggett, http://doggett.house.
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opinions provide some sharp exchanges from which a neutral
observer would rather quickly note their opposing world views.
20 0
Without implying that either man is particularly Machiavellian,
20 1
one can easily imagine that justices of such opposing views would be
tempted to vote strategically on recusal matters in hopes of having a
resulting court makeup more likely to render decisions to their
liking. One could reasonably assume that a Comyn-like judge would
want to see a Doggett-like judge disqualified and vice versa, at least
gov/index.php?option=com-content&view-article&id=43&Itemid=54 (last visited
Oct. 18, 2009). Afterwards, beginning at the age of twenty-six, Doggett served in
the Texas Senate for 11 years. Id. While there, he helped to create the Texas
Commission on Human Rights. Id. Doggett began serving on the Texas Supreme
Court in 1988 and was elected to the House of Representatives in 1994. Id. He
serves as a member of the House Budget Committee as well as a senior member of
the House Ways and Means Committee. Id. On the Ways and Means Committee,
Doggett fought the privatization of Social Security. Id. Doggett has been referred
to as the "Lone Star antithesis of [GOP member Tom] DeLay." John Nichols,
Hammered, NATION, Nov. 22, 2004, at 8.
200. See, e.g., Union Bankers Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 889 S.W.2d 278, 286
(Tex. 1994) (Cornyn, J., dissenting in part) (Comyn calling Doggett's majority
opinion "just plain wrong" in a case involving a bad faith insurance dispute);
Natividad v. Alexsis Inc., 875 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. 1994) (Doggett joining dissent
from Comyn's majority opinion holding that contractual privity is required for the
duty of good faith and fair dealing to extend to an insurance company's adjuster);
Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Dominguez, 873 S.W.2d 373, 377
(Tex. 1994) (Doggett, J., dissenting) (Doggett dissenting from Comyn's majority
holding that there was no evidence of bad faith denial on the part of the insurer and
stating that "[t]his decision merely represents a predetermined result in search of a
rationale").
201. Niccolo Machiavelli was a political adviser in Renaissance Italy who is
generally viewed as amoral, unemotional, rational, and ruthless in part because he
was thought willing to use most any means to achieve desired ends. See Peter R.
Reilly, Was Machiavelli Right? Lying in Negotiation and the Art of Defensive Self-
Help, 24 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. (forthcoming 2009) (summary description of
Machiavelli and his perceived legacy); Niccolo Machiavelli Biography,
http://people.brandeis.edu/-teuber/machiavellibio.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2009)
(providing biography and commentary of Machiavelli's life and works); see also
NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (Leo Paul S. de Alvarez trans., 1981) (1532)
(providing guidance on how a prince can acquire a throne or retain power and
advocating that the greatest moral good comes from having a stable state, even if
cruel means must be used to achieve necessary ends). Arguably, Machiavelli has
received an unduly negative reputation in that his views can be characterized more
charitably. Nonetheless, the term "Machiavellian" has come to signify ruthless
and calculating commitment to advancing one's personal agenda.
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if a case was close and possessed at least some ideological
dimension.
The 1990s also provided an example of a less ideological or
political, but more personal, conflict. The Nevada Supreme Court
was involved in an intense internal battle rooted in part in personality
clashes and overtly launched when trial judge Jerry Carr Whitehead
was accused of judicial improprieties.202  To oversimplify, two
members of the five-member Court sympathized with Judge
Whitehead's plight, tended to believe he was innocent, and wished to
limit public reporting of the investigation surrounding him, while
two and sometimes three other justices viewed Judge Whitehead less
favorably and sought greater public access of his and other judicial
discipline proceedings.2 °3 The result was several years of backbiting
among the justices, including battles over recusal that many saw as
proxies reflecting the larger battle rather than dispassionate analysis
of disqualification matters.2 °4
202. See Mark Hansen, Nevada Supreme Court Investigated Ethics experts
criticize its decision to stay disciplinary probe of Reno judge, 80 A.B.A. J. 26, 26
(June 1994) (describing "legal battle" in Whitehead matter as "bitter"); Paul M.
Barrett, Discipline Case Divides Nevada's Supreme Court, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22,
1996, at Bi, col. 3 (noting throughout the article intense personal clashes of
justices); sources cited in note 204, infra. In a footnote to history, Judge
Whitehead also briefly achieved some notoriety as the trial judge in a well-
publicized case in which claims against the rock group Judas Priest for allegedly
causing the suicide of two fans was rejected by Whitehead and upheld by the
Nevada Supreme Court. See Court Ruling on Judas Priest Upheld, BILLBOARD,
June 12, 1993, at 81; Rock band cleared in suicide, DAILY VARIETY, June 1, 1993
at 6 (after four-week trial, Whitehead found that subliminal messages existed on
group's "Stained Class" album but were unintentional and did not create liability
for suicides). Judge Whitehead subsequently resigned from the bench and
practiced as a successful mediator but continues on occasion to attract controversy.
See, e.g., A.D. Hopkins, Ousted judge not forgotten, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Dec. 11,
2006, at lB (seminar room named in honor of Whitehead at UNLV's Boyd School
of Law at donor's request criticized by former Nevada Supreme Court Justice
Robert Rose, who while on Court was part of anti-Whitehead faction of the Court).
203. See Barrett, supra note 202 and other sources cited in note 202 and
infra note 204. See also Sean Whaley, Springer ready to leave court, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J., Jan. 2, 1999, at lB (retiring Justice Charles Springer, a member of the
pro-Whitehead characterizes as "unfair and counterproductive" some reporting
about the case, which article notes "split the court and gave its public image a
black eye from which it has yet to fully recover.").
204. See, e.g., Whitehead v. Nev. Comm'n on Judicial Discipline, 920 P.2d
491, 508 (Nev. 1996) (concluding that "the opinion and writ of prohibition issued
by the three justices . . . are void and of no legal force or effect whatsoever"),
[Vol. 29:2
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D. Continuing Concern over Substantive Due Process
and Disqualification
Faced with the realistic limits of full state supreme court
review of recusal matters, one can make a strong case that procedural
due process requires that a neutral judicial body other than the state
supreme court itself decide whether recusal is required. For
example, the state supreme court could appoint a panel of judges to
hear such motions. A state might also create a judicial
disqualification commission that would hear such motions directed at
supreme court justices. Although these mechanisms could pose state
constitutional problems (particularly separation of powers if a non-
judicial group is involved), they are well worth exploring as an
alternative to allowing a usually tight-knit group of colleagues to sit
in back-scratching judgment of one another.
But, despite the practical concerns surrounding recusal at the
state supreme court level, it appears that with modest tweaking, the
state judicial systems can largely avoid the Caperton problem-even
if Caperton disqualification is made congruent with recusal under
the ABA Judicial Code-simply by putting in place better
mechanisms for reviewing the self-interested decision making of
stricken as void by Del Papa v. Steffen, 920 P.2d 489 (Nev. 1996); Whitehead v.
Nev. Comm'n on Judicial Discipline, 893 P.2d 866, 946 (Nev. 1995) ("When a
newspaper was asked to correct public misstatements, the request for journalistic
fairness, quite remarkably, was used by the commission as a basis for trying to
disqualify two members of this panel), superseded by constitutional amendment,
NEV. CONST. art. VI, § 21(amended 1998), as stated in Mosley v. Nev. Comm'n
on Judicial Discipline, 22 P.3d 655 (Nev. 2001); see also Stephen Magagnini,
Nevada's Top Court Hogtied by Feud: Justices Tangle Over Probe of Reno Judge,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 17, 1996, at Al ("The court is split 3-2 over the judicial
discipline case of Jerry Carr Whitehead, a Reno judge accused of bullying lawyers
who wanted him removed from cases."); Ed Vogel, High Court Rejects Attorney 's
Request, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Oct. 2, 1997, at 3B ("Fitzsimmons wanted [Justice
Bob] Rose booted off a city of Las Vegas condemnation case involving her client,
Whiteacre Investment Co. ... [B]ut Justice Cliff Young, writing for the majority
said the court 'simply cannot afford to further dissipate its limited resources on
these disqualification matters."'); Todd Woody, Nevada's No-Holds-Barred
Politics and Casino Culture has Made Serving on the State's Supreme Court a
Dicey Proposition, RECORDER (SAN FRANCISCO), Oct. 6, 1997, at 1 ("[H]erself
deeply involved in the judicial jihads that have roiled Nevada's small legal
community, Fitzsimmons currently is engaged in a running battle to disqualify
Rose from the cases she represents due to his alleged "extreme animus" toward
her.").
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justices facing recusal motions.2 °5 Coupled with the generally good
supervision of disqualification decisions made by lower court judges,
this suggests that a broader form of constitutional due process
disqualification consistent with Model Judicial Code recusal would
rarely require Caperton-style intervention by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Consequently, one can, with little effort, imagine a world
where state courts treat judicial disqualification more seriously, with
relatively little instance of U.S. Supreme Court supervision.
There still would remain the nagging problem of occasional
miscarriages of justice in which a state supreme court (or a body
205. See Goldberg et al., supra note , at 526-32 (outlining procedural
devices by which state courts can minimize the risk of error in denial of
disqualification). A preliminary variant of this sort of review can take place if
recusal motions at the trial level are decided in the first instance by a trial judge
other than that under challenge. This can occur either in the first instance or as an
intermediate check on the challenged judge's decision prior to any eventual
appellate review. For example, in Nevada state court, recusal motions based
exclusively on Canon 3(E) are in the first instance decided by the challenged judge
while motions based on the disqualification statute (NEV. REV. STAT. § 1.230,
which differs from the "reasonable question as to impartiality" standard of the
Judicial Code and requires "actual bias or prejudice" as well as covering the
financial or family connections set forth in the Code) require an affidavit and are
heard "by another judge agreed upon by the parties or, if they are unable to agree,
by a judge appointed" by the district's chief judge, the chief judge, or the most
senior judge of the district (where the chief judge is disqualified). NEV. REV.
STAT. § 1.235(5)(b). Where there is only one judge in the district, a possibility in
rural areas, the Supreme Court may hear statutorily based disqualification motions.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 1.235(5)(b). Although judges hearing recusal motions under
the Code based on reasonable question as to impartiality may of course simply
recuse, where the judge refuses to recuse, the challenged judge's decision is then
reviewed by the chief judge of the judicial district in a manner similar to that for
statutory disqualification. See STATE BAR OF NEVADA, NEVADA CIVIL PRACTICE
MANUAL § 2.09 (5th ed. 2001 & Supp. 2008) (Sal Gugino, Esq., Chapter author).
Thereafter, of course, an alleged error in failing to recuse may be the subject of an
appeal after final judgment or interlocutory review via a petition for mandamus.
See, e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 894
P.2d 337 (Nev. 1995). See generally NEVADA CIVIL PRACTICE MANUAL, supra,
§§ 2.08, 2.09. In addition, Nevada provides each side in a civil action a right of
peremptory challenge to the original assigned judge. See NEV. S. CT. R. 48.1(3)
(regulating the procedure for a change of a judge by peremptory challenge);
FLAMM, supra note , §§ 27.11, 28.30 (providing peremptory disqualification
provisions for Nevada); see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 1.225(5) (2008) (stating that
where state supreme court justice is disqualified, "a district judge shall be
designated to sit in his place as provided in Section 4 of Article 6 of the
Constitution of the State of Nevada").
[Vol. 29:2
HeinOnline -- 29 Rev. Litig. 318 2009-2010
JUDICIAL RECUSAL
reviewing the court's recusal decisions) refuses to disqualify a judge
or justice who clearly had no business participating in a particular
case. In these cases, it would appear that the disappointed litigant
seeking recusal received full procedural due process but nonetheless
was denied the fundamental right to have only impartial jurists
involved in deciding the merits of the litigant's case. In these
situations, one might reasonably view the litigant as having been
denied substantive due process.
The question remains, however, whether the U.S. Supreme
Court should reach such situations through Caperton-style
invocation of the Due Process Clause. My view is that due process
can properly be invoked to support such Supreme Court policing of
the state courts. Where a state judicial system's disqualification
determination, despite procedural review that seems fair ex ante,
produces grotesquely wrong recusal decisions, the litigant has been
denied a fundamental constitutional guarantee and U.S. Supreme
Court intervention and correction is in order.2 °6
As discussed above, there is certainly similarity between
Supreme Court policing of state court punitive damages awards and
policing of state court decisions involving participation of a judge
who should have been disqualified.20 7  More importantly,
participation of a tainted jurist goes right to the heart of the legal
system's aspiration for fair adjudication in which outcomes are not
determined by the status of a litigant or lawyer. By contrast, a large
damages award, even if unfair, remains the product of the system's
normal and "fair" operation, provided that the defendant received
adequate procedural due process. But when a tainted judge
participates, the litigant has suffered a per se denial of fair
adjudication, regardless of the outcome. In such cases, the entire
adjudication becomes infirm and a reviewing court is left wondering
the degree to which the tainted judge's participation may have made
a difference.
206. See supra Part IV.C (outlining rationale for viewing disqualification
error as denial of due process).
207. Id.
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E. Guidelines for Invoking Substantive Due Process
Disqualification
1. In Campaign Support Cases
To be sure, intervention in state proceedings due to allegedly
erroneous recusal should occur only sparingly. In determining
whether to review such situations stemming from campaign support,
the Court can continue to be guided by the factors set forth in
Caperton and amplified in the Chief Justices' amicus brief, which
sets forth the following "Criteria for evaluating whether due process
requires recusal for campaign spending in a particular case:"
* Size of the Expenditure;
* Nature of the Support;
• Timing of the Support;
• Effectiveness of the Support;
• Nature of Supporter's Prior Political
Activities;
" Nature of Supporter's Pre-existing
Relationship with the Judge; and
* Relationship Between the Supporter and the
Litigant.
20 8
Fleshing out the former chief justices' list of considerations
logically requires considering both the absolute and relative size of
not only the cash outlays but also other, "in kind" campaign support
such as signs, literature, volunteer workers, mailing or registration
lists, phone banks, office space, and the like.
208. See Brief of the Conference of Chief Justices, supra note , at 24-29.
The Brief for the American Bar Association supported a similar use of similar
factors. See Brief for the American Bar Association, supra note , at 19-20
(including factors such as contribution size, importance, timing, and relationship of
judge and supporter).
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2. In General
In addition, the Court should consider the following factors
relevant to the questions of (a) whether a litigant has been denied the
fundamental right of adjudication before a neutral tribunal and (b)
whether the denial of due process merits expenditure of the Court's
limited judicial resources:
* egregiousness of the error in refusing
disqualification;
* importance of the underlying case (financially,
socially, or politically);
* defensibility of the outcome in the underlying
case;
• degree to which poor recusal decisions are
part of a pattern in the particular state or court;
and
" presence or absence of state-based corrective
measures such as impeachment, revision of
state judicial ethics codes, or removal of the
offending judge or judges through election,
retirement, or other means.
Using these templates to help determine the existence and
magnitude of the failure to recuse as a denial of substantive due
process, the Court can act as an important backstop protecting
litigant rights without unnecessarily entangling itself in state court
disqualification practice. Applied to Caperton, these factors augur in
favor of the result reached by Justice Kennedy and the majority.
The first factor for filtering disqualification cases for the
Court should be the apparent egregiousness of the error in refusing
disqualification. In Caperton, the error was enormous.20 9 Even if
209. In addition to his due process error, Justice Benjamin's opinion is
remarkable in that it never grapples with the most salient legal issue regarding his
participation-whether he was, pursuant to Canon 3(E) of the West Virginia
Judicial Code of Conduct, a judge whose impartiality could be reasonably
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Justice Benjamin's clearly incorrect defense of his continued
participation had been subject to fairer procedures such as full court
review, it should not have been allowed to stand. A New York Times
editorial succinctly encapsulated my substantive reaction to the
protests of the four Caperton dissenters:
Indeed, the only truly alarming thing about
[the Caperton] decision was that it was not
unanimous. The case drew an unusual array of
friend-of-court briefs from across the political
spectrum, and such an extreme case about an ethical
matter that should transcend ideology should have
united all nine justices.
Chief Justice Roberts is fond of likening a
judge's role to that of a baseball umpire. It is hard to
imagine that professional baseball or its fans would
trust the fairness of an umpire who accepted $3
million from one of the teams. 1 °
Applying the standard of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and Rule 2.11 of
the Model Judicial Code, it seems inarguable that a reasonable lay
observer would reasonably question Justice Benjamin's ability to be
impartial in an important case involving a company headed by his
seven-figure campaign contributor.
Next, if one considers the financial, social, and political
importance of the underlying case, Caperton's intervention seems
justified. The underlying fraud and tortious interference litigation
obviously involved a good deal of money, resulting in a $50 million
judgment. It also involved a leading business in the state (coal
mining) and at least one large and economically important litigant
(Massey). It further attracted the attention of the state's most
important labor union, the United Mine Workers, which weighed in
on Caperton's side211 (Caperton had operated the Harman Mine as a
questioned. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 286-309 (W.
Va. 2008) (Benjamin, J., concurring) (never dealing with the issue), rev'd, 129 S.
Ct. 2252 (2009).
210. Honest Justice, supra note.
211. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Filed on Behalf of the United Mine
Workers of America, Caperton, 679 S.E.2d 223 (W. Va. 2008) (No. 33350), 2008
WL 793475 (Supporting Caperton in the West Virginia Supreme Court).
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union mine; when Massey wrested control, union jobs were lost). 212
Further, the underlying case had significant implications for the
manner in which business is conducted in the state. A victory for
Massey logically would have, at least at the margins, encouraged
sharper practices in the Blankenship mold.
Beyond this, the West Virginia Supreme Court's acceptance
of Massey's res judicata and forum selection arguments on appeal
created the possibility of rather substantial changes in state
procedural doctrine with attendant impact on future litigation. The
West Virginia high court's determination on these issues, at least
until set aside by the U.S. Supreme Court, clearly expanded both the
potential application of preclusion doctrine and the interpretative
scope given to forum selection clauses.
A third filtering factor is the substantive outcome in this case
involving participation by a tainted jurist whose partiality is subject
to substantial question. Applied to Caperton, this factor supports the
majority's decision to intervene on due process grounds. Recall that
in two decisions, the West Virginia court did not question the
213substantive outcome on the merits. Particularly in the first of its
two decisions, the court essentially acknowledged that Massey had
engaged in wrongful conduct toward Caperton. But on the basis of a
technical legal defense problematically applied, the West Virginia
Supreme Court threw out a sizeable judgment against an apparently
conceded wrongdoer. In addition, in Caperton, the tainted jurist cast
the deciding vote.
The fourth filtering factor-the degree to which poor recusal
decisions are part of a pattern in the particular state or court-is less
clear. However, there seems to be at least some significant evidence
suggesting that West Virginia has not been particularly vigilant in
ensuring that jurists do not participate in cases raising questions as to
their impartiality. Without doubt, the state has been a hotbed of
judicial politics that raise concerns about whether the judiciary has
become excessively politicized.214
212. See Gibeaut, supra note , at 52 (describing how Caperton had replaced
contract workers with 150 union miners, only to later succumb to bankruptcy due
to Massey's actions).
213. Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 265 (Albright, J. and Cookman, J., sitting on
special assignment for disqualified justice, dissenting).
214. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257-58
(2009) (noting substantial campaign expenditures and politicized race for state
high court); Opinion, Politics v. Justice, CLEVELAND PLAiN DEALER, June 29,
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The fifth factor is presence or absence of state-based
corrective measures such as impeachment, revision of state judicial
ethics codes, or removal of the offending judge or judges through
election, retirement, or other means. As of June 2009, Justice
Benjamin was, unsurprisingly, still on the West Virginia high court,
with his term running through 2016.215 There appears to have been
no serious talk of his impeachment or retirement. Neither has there
been suggested any amendment to the state's judicial code to ensure
that future jurists in his position must recuse.216
In sum, the five suggested factors for guiding Supreme Court
invocation of substantive due process recusal point quite
overwhelmingly in the direction of ejecting Justice Benjamin from
the case, even if his participation had been permitted after full state
supreme court review. In addition, since the grounds for the
Benjamin disqualification are campaign-related, consideration of the
chief justices' factors (i.e. amount of contribution, impact, recency,
and relation to the case) also strongly supports Justice Benjamin's
disqualification.
When facing future certiorari petitions involving due process
disqualification, the Court can apply these factors (as well as those of
the chief justices' amicus brief in cases involving campaign support)
to determine which cases, if any, present sufficiently serious
disqualification problems to justify Supreme Court intervention in
state judicial outcomes. Armed with these considerations, the Court
need not accept an inordinate number of such cases. The Court
would then be free to move from Caperton's potentially problematic
"probability of bias" standard to one mirroring the general norm: a
2009, at A9 ("The U.S. Supreme Court's ruling that a West Virginia Supreme
Court judge should have recused himself from a case involving a big campaign
contributor raises a caution sign for many states."); Editorial, Virtues of an
Appointed Judiciary, 196 N.J.L.J. 898, 898 (2009) ("The trumpet of judges raising
money from eventual litigants, delivering speeches to special interest groups,
airing campaign commercials and generally worrying about whether they enjoy
sufficient popularity to remain in office is, happily an anathema to [New Jersey].
Not so in states like West Virginia .... "); sources cited supra note.
215. West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, Justices and Staff, http://
www.state.wv.us/wvsca/Justices.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2009).
216. In fact, West Virginia has not even put together a committee to review
the American Bar Association's 2007 revisions to the Judicial Code of Conduct.
Status of State Review of ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct (2007),
AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, Oct. 7, 2009, available at http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/jclr/jud_status_chart.pdf.
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litigant is denied due process when a state has insufficient procedural
guarantees of correct disqualification decisions or when, despite
procedural protections, a clearly disqualified judge participates in a
matter.
V. CONCLUSION
Although its critics see Caperton as an unwise intrusion into
state elections and state disqualification practice, Caperton's biggest
problem is that it did not go far enough and make due process
congruent with prevailing state and federal disqualification
standards. In particular, the Court should recognize that any error in
failing to recuse deprives the affected litigant of a fundamental
constitutional right-the right to have the case heard by a neutral
magistrate. Consequently, any rejection of a request to recuse is at
least technically one of constitutional dimension that should be
potentially subject to U.S. Supreme Court review and correction.
Although there are good reasons to hesitate in creating or
recognizing rights of substantive due process, the impartiality of the
bench lies at the core of our notions of law and justice. When a case
is heard by a judge who should have recused, this deprives the
litigants of the very essence of fair adjudication and constitutes a
type of error greater in kind and magnitude than other judicial
mistakes. If the Court is to make any forays into the field of
substantive due process, the case for such intervention is greater here
than in perhaps any other area of law.
Adopting the more straightforward reasonable-question-as-
to-impartiality standard in lieu of the more problematic probability
of bias standard should not strain judicial resources. The Court need
not become mired in the flood of disqualification cases predicted by
the dissenting doomsayers in Caperton. Insistence upon review of
disqualification decisions by a neutral body of judges will largely
ensure that litigants receive sufficient procedural due process.
Where erroneous recusal decisions occur in spite of such safeguards,
U.S. Supreme Court review should be available as necessary to
vindicate the strong constitutional interest in neutral courts and fair
adjudication, an interest sounding in substantive due process.
In making its assessments regarding whether review of non-
disqualification is required, the Court should consider the five factors
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set forth in this article and the considerations outlined in the
Caperton amicus brief submitted by the Conference of Chief
Justices. Using these yardsticks, the Court can, as necessary, make
infrequent forays into judicial disqualification matters without
unduly burdening the court or creating either uncertainty or paranoia
among state judges and justices.
Even if one accepts the implicit assertion of the Caperton
dissenters that the decision was something like using a "nuclear
option," both the constitutional interest in fair courts and the facts of
the case justified this heavy artillery. So deployed, Caperton seems
likely to have a positive effect in deterring poor disqualification
decisions by state courts. Better still, the Court in Caperton could
have harmonized the disqualification standards required by the
Constitution with those required under federal and state law modeled
on the ABA Model Judicial Code. As shown in this article, unifying
the constitutional and nonconstitutional standards for judicial
disqualification is feasible and can improve future Court supervision
of recusal.
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